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Cooperative Interbranch Federalism:
Certification of State-Law Questions
by Federal Agencies
Verity Winship
63 Vand. L. Rev. 181 (2010)
When an unresolved state-law question arises in federal
court, the court may certify it to the relevant state court. The practice
of certification from one court to another has been widely adopted
and has been touted as "help[ing] build a cooperative judicial
federalism." This Article proposes that states promote cooperative
interbranch federalism by allowing federal agencies to certify
unresolved state-law questions to state courts. It draws on
Delaware's recent expansion of potential certifying entities to the
Securities and Exchange Commission to argue that this innovation
should be extended to other states and other federal agencies.
Certification from federal agencies to state courts promotes
cooperative interbranch federalism by preserving state control over
certain primary conduct and allocating decisionmaking according to
institutional expertise. Certification allows an agency that is expert in
a specialized federal statutory and regulatory scheme to certify
questions to a court that is expert in state law. Because the proposed
certification procedure is from an agency, its effect depends on the
availability of judicial review and the type of agency activity-in
particular,whether the agency is engaged in formal adjudication or
informal action. Federal agency certification has the potential to speed
resolution of state-law questions when a federal agency acts through
reviewable adjudication. The need for certification is particularly
acute, however, when judicial review is unavailable and little recourse
may otherwise be had for interpretationsof state law that the state may
ultimately reject.
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INTRODUCTION

When an unresolved state-law question arises in federal court,
the court may "certify" it to the relevant state court. The practice of
certification from one court to another has become widely accepted:
most states allow their highest court to answer certified questions
from federal judges and sometimes from other states' courts.'
Certification by federal courts (what this Article terms "judicial
certification") has been touted as "sav[ing] time, energy and resources
and help[ing] build a cooperative judicial federalism." 2 This Article
proposes that states promote cooperative interbranch federalism by
allowing federal agencies to certify unresolved state-law questions to
state courts.
Interbranch certification may be thought of broadly as any
certification process between different branches of the government.
Certification by federal agencies to state courts (what this Article calls
"federal agency certification") is a special species of interbranch
certification. It is this Article's focus because it raises fundamental
questions about when and how federal administrative agencies decide
issues of state law. Moreover, unlike certification from a federal court
to a state court, it operates along two axes: -interjurisdictional (federal
to state) relations and interbranch (agency to judiciary) relations.
Because federal agency certification is interjurisdictional, a
certification procedure would address some of the same problems as
certification by federal courts to state courts. General notions of
1.
Eric Eisenberg, Note, A Divine Comity: Certification (At Last) in North Carolina, 58
DUKE L.J. 69, 71 n.13 (2008) (noting that North Carolina is the only state not to have adopted a
certification procedure); see also Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certificationof Questions of
State Law to State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159 n.13 (2003)
(citing state laws enabling certification procedures).
2.
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
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comity and federalism are often invoked to explain the benefits of
judicial certification-federal entities can show respect for state
sovereignty by refraining from deciding certain state-law questions.
This general rationale extends to any certifying entity, including
federal agencies, when the certification is between the federal and
state systems. This Article goes beyond this general rationale to
identify the more particular benefits to state courts: namely, allowing
state courts additional opportunities to decide state-law questions and
preserving their control over certain primary conduct, particularly
when a question implicates state policy.
The fact that a federal agency rather than a court is the
certifying entity complicates the picture. In the context of the federal
agency, even more so than a federal court, certification allocates
decisionmaking according to institutional expertise. It reflects the
judgment that a state court is expert in the laws of the state in which
it sits, while a federal agency is expert in a national statutory and
regulatory scheme-usually in a specialized or technical area. Thus, a
state court is more institutionally suited to deciding unresolved statelaw issues that impact state policy than a federal agency.
Whether federal agency certification makes sense depends on
the type of action the agency undertakes and the availability of
judicial review. Federal agency certification has the potential to speed
resolution of difficult or important state questions when a federal
agency's action is subject to judicial review. In addition, the need for
certification is particularly acute when no judicial review of agency
action is available and little recourse may otherwise be had for
interpretations of state law that the state may ultimately reject. This
need reflects a central problem in administrative law regarding how to
subject informal agency action to an appropriate level of review.
Federal agency certification also gives the agency a mechanism for
seeking expert resolution of an issue that is simply unresolved or
controversial and particularly linked to state policy decisions.
Part I outlines existing certification procedures, beginning with
the widespread practice of allowing state courts to consider state-law
questions certified from federal and sometimes other states' courts. It
then examines the limited existing examples of interbranch
certification: some states' inclusion of non-Article III courts as
permissible certifying courts and Delaware's recent expansion of
potential certifying entities to the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC").
Part II examines the practical need for a federal agency
certification process. This Part identifies instances in which federal
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agencies determine state law or in which they are faced with the type
of unresolved or important state-law issues that lend themselves to
certification. Although the variety of federal agencies and of the
legislative and regulatory schemes they administer makes
generalizing difficult, this Part draws on examples from such agencies
as the SEC, the Internal Revenue Service, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board to
suggest that some agencies frequently make state-law determinations.
Even when interpretations are infrequent, agencies may face statelaw questions that are important but unresolved, making certification
to a state court appropriate. In other words, federal agency
certification solves a real problem.
The argument that certification promotes cooperative
interbranch federalism is developed in Part III. Federal agency
certification enhances states' control of the primary conduct of those
subject to state law and avoids putting the federal agency in the
position of predicting state law-and potentially "getting it wrong."
Furthermore, focusing on the "interbranch" aspect of certification,
Part III argues that federal agency certification allocates
decisionmaking according to institutional expertise. While federal
agencies are expert in the federal law they administer, agencies are
less expert in state law than either federal or state courts, making
certification particularly appropriate in the interbranch context. This
Part also focuses on different aspects of federal agency activity: formal
adjudication and informal action. It examines the benefits of federal
agency certification for each activity, concluding that the mechanism
is particularly needed in the absence of judicial review.
Part IV considers implementation and addresses the most
significant concerns with agency certification: that it results in
impermissible advisory opinions on the side of the state or
impermissible subdelegation by agencies, and that some of the most
difficult questions may inextricably mix state and federal law. Finally,
this Part details the proposed certification procedure and examines
how it would modify current practices. Drawing on the earlier debate
over judicial certification, Part IV suggests several bases for resolving
the concerns with advisory opinions, subdelegation, and mixed
questions of federal and state law.
I. CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Defined broadly, certification is a procedure by which one
entity is able to obtain from the determining entity a conclusive
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answer to a question of law. 3 It is one of several mechanisms that
mediate among different jurisdictions and branches of government,
each of which could legitimately make decisions in that area.4 One of
its defining characteristics is that a decision of the certifying entity
would not bind anyone beyond the parties involved in the particular
matter.
The most well-established certification mechanism allows
federal courts to certify unresolved questions of state law to the
highest state court.5 The federal court has the subject matter
jurisdiction to decide an issue of state law, but it instead seeks an
opinion from a state court. Although federal courts are typically the
certifying entities, some states allow their courts to certify questions
to courts in other states and to hear such state-certified questions. For
instance, a Wisconsin court might certify a question of Minnesota law
to the Minnesota state court.6
Both of these examples are interjurisdictional, but certification
may also be intra-jurisdictional. Within the federal court system, for
instance, the Courts of Appeals may certify questions to the United

3.
Cf. Allan D. Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. REV. 629, 629-30 (1951)
("[C]ertification of questions of law is a procedure by which an inferior court is able to obtain
from a defining court a conclusive answer to a material question of law.").
4.
Other mechanisms include abstention, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and advisory
opinions. See infra Part L.A and Part IV.A (discussing abstention and advisory opinions). The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows a federal court that has jurisdiction over a matter to stay
a proceeding and refer it to an administrative agency for initial resolution where the area lies
peculiarly within the expertise of the agency. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh,
538 U.S. 644, 673-74 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]he legal doctrine of 'primary
jurisdiction' permits a court itself to 'refer' a question to the [agency]. That doctrine seeks to
produce better informed and uniform legal rulings by allowing courts to take advantage of an
agency's specialized knowledge, expertise, and central position within a regulatory regime."
(citing United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-65 (1956))).
5.

JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE 1

(1995) (describing certification as "the procedure by which a court (usually federal), when faced
with an issue of unclear state law, can request a decision on the point from that state's supreme
court"). As has been pointed out, existing judicial certification procedures are not symmetrical:
state courts do not certify questions of federal law to federal courts. J. Bruce M. Selya, Certified
Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . . , 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 677, 684-85 (1995). Accordingly,
although this article uses the term "judicial certification" narrowly to refer to certification from
federal and sometimes other states' courts to state courts, one can imagine a more expansive
definition that includes certification from state to federal court or, indeed, from any court to any
other court.
6.
See WIS. STAT. § 821.08 (2009) (empowering Wisconsin courts to certify questions to
other states' courts); MINN. STAT. § 480.065(3) (2009) (permitting the Minnesota Supreme Court
to answer certified questions from other state appellate courts); see also In re Certified Question
from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 2007) (answering a
question certified by a Texas state court about the duty of a property owner).

186

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1:181

States Supreme Court.7 Several states have similar procedures for
intra-jurisdictional certification.8
The agency certification this Article proposes is both
interjurisdictional and, unlike the familiar judicial certification
procedure, interbranch. Until recently, the only instance of
interbranch certification was some states' inclusion of non-Article III
courts in their certification procedures. 9 While non-Article III courts
and agencies are closely related when the agency engages in
adjudication, non-Article III courts do not engage in rulemaking or
informal action. Accordingly, certification from non-Article III courts
is a more limited expansion of traditional judicial certification than
agency certification would be. The only existing example of the type of
agency certification proposed here is Delaware's recent experiment
with allowing certification from the SEC. To understand how agency
certification expands on the existing framework, this Part examines
first the mechanism of judicial certification and then the limited
experiments in interbranch and agency certification.
A. WidespreadJudicial Certification
The Supreme Court and others have lauded certification by
federal courts to state courts as a pragmatic mechanism that promotes
the speedy resolution of controversies and, in the Court's words,
"cooperative judicial federalism." 0 Such certification grew out of the
Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, in which
the Court directed federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state law
to resolve substantive issues." In a series of cases beginning in the
1970s, the Supreme Court has encouraged its use. 12 The Court's
7.
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2006); James William Moore & Allan D. Vestal, Present and
PotentialRole of Certification in FederalAppellate Procedure,35 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1949).
8.
CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT Prefatory Note, 12 U.L.A. 46 n.1 (1995) ("[A]
great number of states have provided for certified questions within their court systems."); Vestal,
supra note 3, at 632.
9.
Advisory opinions are also "interbranch." For a discussion about the relationship
between certification and advisory opinions, see infra Part IV.A.
10. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
11. 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
12. Certification was first introduced by Florida in a 1945 statute that allowed the Supreme
Court of Florida to adopt rules allowing it to accept certified questions from federal circuit courts.
Despite the fact that this statute had been ignored and the Florida court had never adopted such
rules, in 1960 the U.S. Supreme Court in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. praised the Florida
Legislature's "rare foresight" in enacting a certification statute and encouraged its use. 363 U.S.
207, 212 (1960). See generally GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 4-5 (tracing the introduction of
certification). In 1974, in Lehman Bros. v. Schein, the Court again endorsed certification
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approval was not lost on state legislatures or on state courts. The
procedure has become widespread, with all but one state allowing the
state's highest court to answer certified questions from federal judges
and sometimes from other states' courts as well. 13
Certification developed in part as a response to abstention.
Abstention doctrine and procedures identify instances in which the
federal courts, despite having jurisdiction, should refrain from
deciding an unsettled issue of state law. Abstention was appropriate
to avoid reaching a federal constitutional issue unnecessarily, to avoid
interfering with a state administrative scheme, to allow states to
resolve state-law questions, or to avoid duplicative litigation.14
Certification offered a more efficient alternative to abstention or
another mechanism when abstention was a close call.15
The form and particular language of state authorization vary,
but one common characteristic is that the procedure is voluntary on
both sides. That is, federal courts and other states' courts are not
obliged to certify state-law questions, no matter how unresolved or

procedures, directing the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to "reconsider whether the
controlling issue of Florida law should be certified to the Florida Supreme Court . . . ." 416 U.S.
at 391. Two years later, in Bellotti v. Baird, the Court held that the district court "should have
certified" to the highest court of Massachusetts the question of interpretation of a new state
statute governing abortion by minors. 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976). For more recent Supreme Court
encouragement of certification, see City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 470-71 (1987).
13. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 71, n.13. Note that Missouri has suggested that its
certification procedure would be unconstitutional. Grantham v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., No. 72576,
1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July 13, 1990) (en banc).
14. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-33 & n.29 (1943); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER,
EDWARD H. COOPER & VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4241 (3d ed.
2008) (discussing the development and evolution of abstention as a judicial doctrine).
15. When a federal court abstains, parties must refile in state court and work through the
state court system from the trial court up to the highest court to get the resolution they sought
initially in federal court. See John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, InterjurisdictionalCertificationand
Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411, 415 (1988). Although certification's genesis was as an
alternative to abstention, use of certification has extended beyond the limits of abstention and
courts would generally not abstain if certification were not available. Empirical evidence
supports this suggestion that certification has not simply replaced abstention but is used even
when abstention would be inappropriate. All judges responding to a 1985 survey of federal and
state judges' experience of certification said that they would not have abstained from deciding
the case if certification had not been an option. Id. at 445, 448 (describing the survey responses
of thirty-one state court judges and eighteen federal judges experienced with certification).
Moreover, the "attractiveness as an alternative to complete abstention" was one of the factors to
which the judges gave little weight in the choice of certifying or accepting a certified question. Id.
at 450-51, tbls.2 & 3.
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intertwined with state policy.16 Moreover, even if a court certifies a

question, the receiving state court is not obliged to answer it; in many
instances, state courts have declined to do so. 17 Nonetheless, both
certifying and answering courts have used the procedure. The subject
matter of the issues that federal courts have certified has been varied
and has included questions about the scope of abortion statutes,18 the
power of cities,19 the standing rules for claims of tortious interference
with a corpse, 20 whether an Internet domain name is "property"
subject to the tort of conversion, 21 and the scope of a state's long-arm
statute.22
The language of state authorization often is based on the 1967
or 1995 version of Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act
("Uniform Act"). The Uniform Act proposed the following language for
defining the powers of the answering court:
The [Supreme Court] of this State may answer a question of law certified to it by a court
of the United States or by [an appellate] [the highest] court of another State [or of a
tribe] [or of Canada, a Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican state], if the
answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court

16. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. § 0.27 ("Where authorized by state law, this Court may certify to the
highest court of a state an unsettled and significant question of state law that will control the
outcome of a case pending before this Court." (emphasis added)).
17. See, e.g., Yesil v. Reno, 705 N.E.2d 655, 655 (N.Y. 1998) (declining to hear a certified
question concerning personal jurisdiction over a federal immigration official because the issue
was not dispositive and was unlikely to arise in state court). See generally GOLDSCHMIDT, supra
note 5, at 35-39 (describing the reasons state supreme courts decline to answer certified
questions, including where the issue is not one of public importance, not dispositive, or where, in
the state court's view, binding precedent already exists).
18. Cf. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976) (holding that the federal district court
should have certified to the state court the question of the procedure for parental consent for
abortions by unmarried women under eighteen).
19. See City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425, 457-58 (2d Cir. 2008)
(certifying the question of the city's power to assert a common law nuisance suit against cigarette
manufacturers).
20. Amaker v. King County, 540 F.3d 1012, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008) (asking the state supreme
court "to determine whether . . . the decedent's sister . . . has standing to bring a claim for

tortious interference with a corpse, and whether the [Washington Anatomical Gift Act] creates a
private right of action").
21. Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003).
22. Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 557 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2009) (deciding
whether the posting of an allegedly defamatory story about a Florida-based company on a
website owned and operated by a nonresident with no other connection to Florida was "electronic
communications 'into Florida' " and such that the website owner would be subject to personal
jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute); Landoil Res. Corp. v Alexander & Alexander
Servs., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 31, 565 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1990) (deciding whether a syndicate was
"doing business" in New York such that it was subject to personal jurisdiction under New York's
long-arm statute).
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and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this
State. 23

Although the breadth of state authorizations varies, two
requirements suggested by the Uniform Act are common to most
states. First, most states' judicial certification procedures require that
no controlling precedent exists in state law.24 Second, most states
include language requiring that the question certified be
"determinative" or that it "may be determinative" of the litigation in
federal court. 25 In part because this requirement is aimed at lessening
the concern that answering courts generate impermissible advisory
opinions, 26 most states have adopted such a requirement, and judges
take it seriously.27 Moreover, state courts have rejected a request for
an answer where they have found that the question is not dispositive
or determinative. 28
Florida's certification procedure provides an example. 29 The
Florida constitution allows the Florida Supreme Court to answer
questions certified by the U.S. Supreme Court or a U.S. Court of
Appeals as long as the question is "determinative of the cause" and
"there is no controlling precedent of the supreme court of Florida."30
The court rule that implements this certification procedure mirrors
this language, 31 allowing certification as broad as the constitution
permits. It also details such procedural requirements as "a statement
of the facts showing the nature of the cause and the circumstances out
of which the questions of law arise . . . ."32

23. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 53 (1995).
24. GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 18-19 & n.1 (noting that states that require absence of
precedent either say that "it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent" or
"there is no controlling precedent").
25. Id. at 18-19.
26. See infra Part IV.A.
27. A 1985 survey of state and federal judges found that state court judges "overwhelmingly
agreed that only issues determinative of the case should be certified. . . ." Corr & Robbins, supra
note 15, at 455.
28. See, e.g., Schlieter v. Carlos, 775 P.2d 709, 710 (N.M. 1989) (declining to answer
certified question about the constitutionality of a medical malpractice act under the state
constitution because the answer would not be determinative of the motion to bifurcate pending
before the certifying federal court); Corr & Robbins, supra note 15, at 455 n. 168 (citing cases).
29. For insight into New York's certification procedure, see Verity Winship, Should New
York Courts Hear Certified Questions from the Securities and Exchange Commission?, 29 PACE L.
REV. 575, 576 (2009) (describing New York's constitutional provision and related court rules).
30. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6).
31. FLA. R. APP.P. 9.150(a).
32. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150(b).
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In addition to these state constitutional, statutory, and rulebased requirements, both answering and certifying courts have sorting
mechanisms designed to gauge the importance of the state-law issue.
So, for example, state courts will sometimes consider the importance
of a question, declining to answer if "the issue is of such limited legal
consequence that it is inappropriate to take the time to produce" an
answer. 33 Federal courts have also incorporated some notion of the
"importance" of the state-law issue into their rules or case law
concerning when a state-law question should be certified. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considers, among other things,
"the importance of the issue to the state and whether the question
implicates issues of state public policy" when deciding whether to
certify a state-law issue. 34 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has said that questions are appropriately certified
when, among other requirements, "the case concerns a matter of vital
public concern." 35
The practice of judicial certification has given rise to an
extensive academic literature. 36 Proponents have suggested that
certification of state-law issues promotes "judicial economy, comity,
ease of application, [and] fairness to the litigants," and importantly,
"avoid[s] judicial guesswork." 37 Critics have objected on pragmatic
grounds that certification may simply be a costly interruption to
33. W. Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 633 (Or. 1991)
("Another factor that goes into our discretionary calculation is the decisional effect of our answer.
... We therefore are called on to decide whether we wish to have a decision of our court on the
subject of the certified question or whether, on the other hand, the issue is of such limited legal
consequence that it is inappropriate to take the time to produce an opinion of this court
concerning it.").
34. O'Mara v. Town of Wappinger, 485 F.3d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 2007) ("In deciding whether to
certify, we consider: (1) the absence of authoritative state court decisions; (2) the importance of
the issue to the state; and (3) the capacity of certification to resolve the litigation." (citing Morris
v. Schroder Capital Mgmt. Int'l, 445 F.3d 525, 531 (2d. Cir. 2006))); see also Fid. & Guar. Ins.
Underwriters, Inc. v. Jasam Realty Corp., 540 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Where unsettled
and significant questions of New York law will control the outcome of a case, Court of Appeals
may certify those questions to the New York Court of Appeals." (quoting Colavito v. N.Y. Organ
Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 229 (2d. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added)).
35. Rennert v. Great Dane P'ship, 543 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Certification is
appropriate when the case concerns a matter of vital public concern, where the issue will likely
recur in other cases, where resolution of the question to be certified is outcome determinative of
the case, and where the state supreme court has yet to have an opportunity to illuminate a clear
path on the issue." (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pate, 275 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir.
2001))).
36. See, e.g., GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 119-37 (providing an annotated bibliography
of select literature).
37. Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for
Reform, 18 J. LEGIS. 127, 134 (1992) (citing Corr & Robbins, supra note 15, at 411).
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federal court litigation. 38 They have also objected on policy grounds
that certification is inconsistent with the goals of federal diversity
jurisdiction3 9 or that federal courts' discretion to certify makes the
procedure "a handout" from federal courts, which "apes federalism,
but does not advance it."40 As a practical matter, however, the debate
over certification from federal courts to state courts is largely over, as
the last states to hold out have adopted certification procedures. 41 In
contrast, certification from federal agencies is a new area of
experimentation that scholars and other commentators have largely
ignored. 42

B. Experiments in InterbranchCertification
Certification by federal agencies, as opposed to courts, was not
contemplated in the early development of certification, particularly
given the roots of federal court certification in Erie and diversity
38. See Selya, supra note 5, at 687-88 (claiming that certification causes "congestion in the
courts, unnecessary duplication of effort, inordinate delay, and added expense" (citing Spiegel v.
Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1988))); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge
Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 168485 (1992) (noting that she was "skeptical that certification presents a viable solution to either the
problem of federal encroachment on state sovereignty or the more limited problem of error in
prophecy").
39. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions
of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1675 (2003) ("[A]t at the very least certification is in
tension with the fundamental purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction.").
40. Selya, supranote 5, at 683 ("[Ihf the federal judiciary really is regarded as an 800-pound
gorilla, certification is exactly the wrong device for keeping the beast at bay. . . . State courts
have absolutely no say in what questions federal courts choose to certify; a state court can refuse
to answer a certified question, but it cannot insist that a question be certified in the first
instance. In this way, certification is little more than a handout; it is cooperation by way of the
gorilla's benevolence. This apes federalism, but does not advance it. At any rate, it is not the kind
of federalism on which states can rest serious expectations.").
41. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 71-72 (noting that North Carolina is the only state not
to have adopted a certification procedure).
42. But see Paul L. Caron, The Role of State Court Decisions In Federal Tax Litigation:
Bosch, Erie, and Beyond, 71 OR. L. REV. 781, 850-52 (1992) (briefly considering the possibility of
using certification in "federal tax controversies that turn on the application of state law"); J.W.
Verret, Federal us. State Law: The SEC's New Ability to Certify Questions to the Delaware
Supreme Court, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar./Apr. 2008, 12 & n.1, available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1156527 (discussing Delaware's new certification procedure that allows
the SEC to certify questions of law directly to the Delaware Supreme Court); Daniel Ross Kahan,
The Administrative State(s): Delaware's New Administrative Certification Procedure, J. Bus. &
SEC. L. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1431611
(arguing that Delaware's certification procedure is beneficial because it promotes state control
over corporate governance); Joseph Antignani, Note, Delaware to the Rescue: A ProperExercise of
Deference by the SEC and the Future Implications of CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, 3 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 431 (2009) (defending the SEC's use of the certification ability).
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jurisdiction as well as certification's role as a practical alternative to
abstention. Nonetheless, states have experimented in extending
certification practices to some non-Article III courts and, recently, a
federal agency.
1. Certification from Non-Article III Courts
Although the majority of existing state certification procedures
permit the state's highest court to answer certified questions from
certain federal courts and occasionally other states' courts, some
provide that other, non-Article III courts may certify questions.43 The
authorizing statutes list specific non-Article III courts or refer to "a
court of the United States," which has sometimes been interpreted to
include bankruptcy courts, military courts, and courts of claims.44
Indeed, the 1995 revision of the Uniform Act proposed the language "a
court of the United States" with the express purpose of allowing
certification from any United States court, "including bankruptcy
courts." 4 5 Because these courts are incorporated into the list of
permissible certifying agencies, the mechanism works like the more
common judicial certification. For instance, participation in
certification from non-Article III courts is voluntary on both sides.
States' treatment of bankruptcy courts provides a sense of
whether state legislatures have been willing to allow certification from
non-Article III courts. As of 2003, four state statutes specifically listed
U.S. bankruptcy courts as permissible certifying entities, 46 while
43. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1861 (2008) (allowing certification from tribal
courts); Mo. REV. STAT. § 477.004(1) (2009) (allowing certification from bankruptcy courts); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-13-105 & 1-13-106 (allowing certification from "a federal court," which includes
the U.S. Supreme Court, courts of appeals and district courts, as well as "any other court created
by act of congress").
44. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 480.065(3) (allowing certification from "a court of the United
States"). See generally GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 17 (listing states that allow certification
from non-Article III courts such as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court).
45. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 53 cmt. (1995). The
language "a court of the United States" replaced the 1967 version of the Uniform Act that listed
particular federal courts. Id. The comments indicate that "[tihis [revision] is intended to permit a
court in a State adopting the section to answer questions certified by any United States court
including bankruptcy courts. Ultimately, the receiving court retains the power to accept or reject
a certified question so that it can control its docket even though the number of courts from whom
it may receive a certified question has been expanded." Id.
46. ALASKA R. APP. P. 407(a) (including "a United States bankruptcy court or United States
bankruptcy appellate panel"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 477.004 (2009) (including "a United States
Bankruptcy Court"); OR. REV. STAT. § 28.200 (2007) (including "a panel of the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel Service"); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 23, § 1 (including "a United States Bankruptcy
Court in Tennessee"). See generally Sharron B. Lane, To Certify or Not to Certify: When Can a
Bankruptcy Court Certify Questions of State Law?, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Jan. 2004, at 6
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sixteen other state courts had interpreted the language of their
statutory grant to include bankruptcy courts. 47 Several other states
use language like "any federal court" or "a court of the United States,"
but have not yet determined whether this language includes
bankruptcy courts. 48 The fact that approximately twenty states permit
certified questions from bankruptcy courts does not, however, indicate
the extent to which the procedure is used, and empirical studies have
not focused on this particular type of certification.
Nonetheless, the potential value of this procedure is suggested
by the fact that bankruptcy courts, the Tax Court, and the federal
Court of Claims are often called upon to decide issues of state law. 4 9
For instance, the Tax Court is often in the position of determining
whether someone is liable for a tax deficit as a "transferee" under
state law.5 0 Similarly, the rights enforced in bankruptcy are rights
created by state law,5 1 so bankruptcy courts look to state law to
determine whether property is an asset of a debtor, 52 the scope of a

app. A (listing the state certification statutes or rules and identifying language and case law
relating to the bankruptcy courts). Despite statutory authorization, for certification, including
certification from bankruptcy courts, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that the Missouri
Constitution does not give it jurisdiction over these questions. See Zeman v. V.F. Factory Outlet,
Inc., 911 F.2d 107, 108-09 (8th Cir. 1990) (discussing the Missouri Supreme Court's order
declining to answer the certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit).
47. See Lane, supra note 46, at app. A (listing case law allowing certification from
bankruptcy courts or panels in Alabama, Arizona, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming).
48. See id. (listing statutory language providing for certification from federal courts).
49. See id. at 7 (citing cases before the bankruptcy court in which the court had to decide an
unresolved issue of state law); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
96-97 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (pointing out that "in the ordinary bankruptcy proceeding
the great bulk of creditor claims are claims that have accrued under state law prior to
bankruptcy-claims for goods sold, wages, rent, utilities, and the like" and that "the bankruptcy
judge is constantly enmeshed in state-law issues").
50. I.R.C. § 6901(a) (2006) (transferee liability applies if a basis exists under applicable
state law); see, e.g., Johnson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 118 T.C. 74, 79-84 (2002) (applying
Texas law to decide that a taxpayer was not liable as a transferee for the federal income tax
liabilities of a corporation he wholly owned because the transfer was not in avoidance of creditors
under Texas law).
51. In re Kaiser, 791 F.2d 73, 74 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S.
48 (1979)).
52. Kallen v. Ash, Anos, Freedman & Logan (In re Brass Kettle Rest., Inc.), 790 F.2d 574,
575 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Weng v. Farb (In re K & L Ltd.), 741 F.2d 1023, 1030 n.7 (7th Cir.
1984)); see also In re Gladstone Glen, 628 F.2d 1015, 1018 (7th Cir. 1980) (relying on state law to
determine whether the debtor is the "legal owner" of an asset).
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state-law homestead exemption, 53 or the validity of a deed
acknowledgment.54
Moreover, at least some of these state-law questions are
"certifiable," as the numerous examples of certification from nonArticle III courts demonstrate. For instance, in Oklahoma, which
permits certification from "a court of the United States,"55 a
bankruptcy court certified two state-law questions to the state court,
including whether Oklahoma's motor vehicle lien perfection statute
could be interpreted using UCC case law regarding substantial
compliance and the perfection of a security interest.5 6 Another
certified question from a bankruptcy court involved "[w]hether a
divorce decree which specifically did not award support alimony may
be modified to award alimony."57
Empirical studies are needed to gauge whether certification
from bankruptcy courts and other non-Article III courts has been
successfully implemented. Nonetheless, many of the arguments for
certification developed here likewise apply to non-Article III courts
53. See In re Arnold, 73 P.3d 861, 862 (Okla. 2003) (answering a U.S. Bankruptcy Court's
certified question on this issue).
54. See In re Akins, 87 S.W.3d 488, 490 (Tenn. 2002) (answering a U.S. Bankruptcy Court's
certified question on this issue). See generally Lane, supra note 46, at 7 (stating that "[s]tate law
issues that arise in bankruptcy cases often recur and have significance beyond the parties before
the court" and that "[niot infrequently, however, state law is in doubt, with no determination
from the state's highest court" and citing illustrative cases).
55. 20 OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 1602 (2002).
56. Woodson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Cook), 637 P.2d 588, 589 (Okla. 1981).
57. In re Key, 930 P.2d 824, 824 (Okla. 1996) (answering question certified to it by the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma); see also JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A
v. Cougar Crest Lodge, L.L.C. (In re Weddle), No. 05-21089-TLM, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3468
(Bankr. D. Idaho Dec. 12, 2006) (certifying question to the Idaho Supreme Court of the priority of
liens between a judgment creditor and beneficiary of a deed of trust under Idaho law). See
generally Lane, supra note 46 (arguing that bankruptcy courts should be able to certify questions
of state law).
Federal courts have also considered, though ultimately rejected, litigants' requests for such
certification of state-law issues on appeals from bankruptcy and tax proceedings. See Holliman v.
Midpoint Dev., L.L.C. (In re Midpoint Dev., L.L.C.), 466 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting motion of debtor to certify question of when an Oklahoma LLC ceases to exist under
state law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court); Pine v. Hartman Paving, Inc. (In re Hartman
Paving, Inc.), 745 F.2d 307, 309 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984) (refusing to certify a state-law question in a
bankruptcy appeal because the state law was settled); Boyter v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
Serv., 668 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (4th Cir. 1981) (refusing to certify a question in an appeal for the
Tax Court because the state-law issue was not necessarily dispositive of the case before the
federal court); First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. United States, 634 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1981)
(refusing to certify a question about a will because the issue was settled in state law); Collier v.
United States (In re Charco, Inc.), No. 1:03-2323, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23160, at *6-7 (S.D.W.
Va. Oct. 25, 2004) (refusing in a bankruptcy appeal to certify an issue of status of judgment lien
because West Virginia law was settled on the issue).
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because of the similarities to agencies that are acting in their
adjudicative roles.5 8 Furthermore, the argument by the drafters of the
Uniform Act that certification should be expanded to non-Article III
courts59 has equal force when applied to administrative agencies
engaged in adjudication. 60
2. Delaware's Experiment with SEC Certification
Delaware, like most states, allows its highest court to answer
certified questions. Its certification procedure, implemented through a
constitutional provision and Supreme Court rules, specifies that the
Delaware Supreme Court may hear certified questions from the U.S.
Supreme Court, U.S. Courts of Appeals, U.S. District Courts, other
states' courts of last resort, and other Delaware courts. 61 Unlike many
states, which have adopted the Uniform Act's requirement that the
state-law question be "determinative" or "dispositive" of the matter
before the certifying court, 62 Delaware adopted a more flexible
standard. It must "appear[] to the [Delaware] Supreme Court that
there are important and urgent reasons for an immediate
determination of such questions by it."63 The court rule lists instances
in which acceptance of a certified question may be appropriate-when
the question is one of first impression or "unsettled," or when

58. Kenneth Karst, Federal Jurisdiction Haiku, 32 STAN. L. REV. 229, 230 (1979)
(provocatively declaring, "Legislative courts / Are but agencies in drag"); Martin H. Redish,
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J.
197, 199-200 ("Although [federal administrative] agencies do not function as 'courts,' they
nevertheless are 'non-article III' bodies in much the same sense as are the less common
legislative courts; the personnel of both do not have the salary and tenure protections of article
III. Nonetheless, agencies arguably adjudicate 'cases' that 'arise under' the laws of the United
States, and these cases constitute one of the central categories of the article III judicial power.").
59. See supranotes 44-45 and accompanying text.
60. In fact, one Court of Claims judge lamented the lack of a certification procedure in a
case concerning creditor rights to trust assets under Maryland law: 'The most satisfactory
resolution of this question of state law would have been by certification to the Maryland Court of
Appeals," but "[u]nfortunately," the Maryland certification procedure did not allow certification
from the Court of Claims. Estate of German v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 641, 645-46 (1985), cited
in Caron, supra note 42, at 852 n.320. The judge concluded that "it is the duty of this court to
approximate the law of the state from decisions of its highest court as best it can." Id.
61. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 41.
62. See, e.g., ALA. R. APP. P. 18 (allowing for certification when issues of state law are
"determinative"); COLO. APP. R. 21.1 (same); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150 (same); MISS. R. APP. P. 20
(same).
63. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8).
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conflicting lower-court opinions exist-but does not limit the Delaware
Supreme Court to this list.64
Delaware's relatively broad certification procedure became
even more expansive in the summer of 2007 when the Delaware
legislature amended the Delaware constitution and court rules to
allow the state supreme court to hear certified questions from the
SEC. 65 The sparse legislative history merely notes that the
amendment is intended to allow the state court to hear questions from
the SEC, as the text suggests, and points to the fact that "[m]ore than
half of the publicly traded companies in the United States are
Delaware corporations."66
Although the SEC could have ignored Delaware's innovation, it
instead chose to use the procedure. The agency certified a question in
June 2008,67 and the Delaware Supreme Court answered it soon
after.68 At issue was whether a company-CA, Inc.-could exclude a
particular shareholder proposal from its proxy materials.69 Under
Rule 14(a) of the Exchange Act, the SEC is tasked with regulating
proxy solicitations. 70 The SEC's proxy rules list the permissible bases
for excluding shareholder proposals, two of which explicitly involve
state law.71 The proposal may be excluded "[i]f the proposal is not a
proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the
jurisdiction of the company's organization" 72 or "[i]f the proposal
would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state,
federal, or foreign law to which it is subject." 73 A third basis for
exclusion sometimes involves an evaluation of state law: proposals
may also be omitted "[i]f the company would lack the power or

64. DEL. SUP. CT. R. 41(b) ("Without limiting the Court's discretion to hear proceedings on
certification, the following illustrate reasons for accepting certification: (i) Original question of
law. The question of law is of first instance in this State; (ii) Conflicting decisions. The decisions
of the trial courts are conflicting upon the question of law; (iii) Unsettled question. The question
of law relates to the constitutionality, construction or application of a statute of this State which
has not been, but should be, settled by the Court.").
65. Act of May 3, 2007, 76 Del. Laws, ch. 37, § 1 (2007); Verret, supra note 42, at 12 & n.1.
66. 76 Del. Laws 2007, ch. 37, § 1.
67. SEC, Certification of Questions of Law Arising from Rule 14a-8 Proposal by
Shareholder of CA, Inc. (June 27, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
other/2008/ca14a8cert.pdf [hereinafter SEC Certification of Questions of Law].
68. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 228 (Del. 2008).
69. Id. at 231; SEC Certification of Questions of Law, supra note 67.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009).
72. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
73. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(2).
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authority to implement the proposal."7 4 If a company wants to exclude
a shareholder's proposal, it may request a "no-action letter" from the
SEC staff.75 These SEC no-action letters indicate whether the agency
would take enforcement action against the company for omitting the
proposal. 76
CA, Inc., sought to exclude a shareholder proposal mandating
of dissident
shareholders' proxy solicitation
reimbursement
7
7
expenses. To evaluate the company's request for a no-action letter,
the SEC had to determine whether such reimbursement was a proper
subject for action by shareholders under Delaware law and whether, if
adopted, it would cause the company to violate Delaware law.78 The
shareholder and the company each submitted an opinion from a
Delaware law firm concerning the content of Delaware law. Faced
with competing interpretations, the SEC certified the question to the
Delaware Supreme Court. That court concluded that shareholders
have the power to pass bylaws but that, as phrased, the proposal
would violate Delaware law because it could prevent the board from
exercising its fiduciary duties to decide whether reimbursement was
appropriate at all. 7 9
Although this Article suggests that federal agency certification
should be adopted more widely, the SEC example can be understood
narrowly as part of ongoing dialogues between Delaware and other
states, and between Delaware and the federal government about
control over corporate law. It fits into the longstanding academic
debate over whether states compete over corporate charters and the
effects of such competition,80 as well as more recent arguments that
Delaware is instead competing with the federal governmentincluding with the SEC-for control over the content and

74. Id. §240.14a-8(i)(6).
75. Id. §240.14a-8; Donna M. Nagy, JudicialReliance on Regulatory Interpretationsin SEC
No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 93839 (1998).
76. Nagy, supra note 75, at 936-37, 938-39.
77. SEC Certification of Questions of Law, supranote 67.
78. Id.
79. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237, 240 (Del. 2008).
80. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 663-66 (1974) (arguing that Delaware had led a "race for the bottom" in corporate
law by providing law attractive to managers); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-58, 289-90 (1977)
(arguing that state competition for corporate charters leads to legal rules that provide value to
shareholders).
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administration of U.S. corporate law.8 1 Seen this way, the expansion of
certification is an ingenious move through which the Delaware
legislature signals the continuing predominance of Delaware in
corporate law. 82 The introduction of SEC certification might also be
seen as a "process innovation" that, with Delaware's cultivated
expertise and a set of specialized courts that is unrivaled in the
United States, is part of the innovative and specialized package that
Delaware offers corporations.83 In sum, there are good reasons for
Delaware to be the early adopter and to limit its certification to the
SEC, 84 although, as seen below, this analysis does not answer the
question of whether broader adoption makes sense.
II. WHEN FEDERAL AGENCIES DETERMINE STATE LAW
Enlarging certification procedures is not costless. Costs include
amending existing provisions and rules, resolving concerns with
advisory opinions and agency subdelegation, and potentially

burdening state courts. Given these costs, certification only makes
sense if the type of unresolved state-law questions we would want to
be certified arise in the agency context. This question is peculiar to the
agency context because agencies are designed to administer federal
81. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 592 (2003)
(arguing that Delaware's real competition comes from the federal government, not other states).
82. Delaware predominates incorporation in the United States: as of the beginning of 2000,
58 percent of corporations were incorporated in Delaware. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen,
Firms'Decisions Where to Incorporate,46 J.L. & ECoN. 383, 389, 391 tbl.2 (2003) (analyzing the
distribution by state of publicly traded firms headquartered and incorporated in the United
States). No other state rivals this percentage; the remaining incorporations are spread among
states, often reflecting the corporation's home state. Id. at 392-93 tbl.3, 394. These numbers
translate into the wide application of Delaware law, in part because the "internal affairs
doctrine" provides that the law of the state of incorporation governs the internal affairs (notably
the relationship between shareholders and directors) of the corporation. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971) (outlining the rule that the law of the state of
incorporation governs internal aspects of the corporation).
83. Steven J. Cleveland, Process Innovation in the Production of Corporate Law, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1829, 1846-59 (2008). Delaware's courts might also lend themselves to certified
questions for an additional reason: Delaware courts' notorious indeterminacy. See, e.g., Jill E.
Fisch, The PeculiarRole of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for CorporateCharters,68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1062, 1075-81 (2000) (arguing that Delaware courts are atypical in that they
function like a legislature, with policy-driven changes in the law, specialized courts, dictum
directed at giving guidance to corporations, and a relaxed use of stare decisis that enables this
quasi-legislative functioning). Delaware's corporate law is unsettled or unpredictable, making it
particularly appropriate to defer to the state for both federalism and interbranch reasons.
84. It is worth noting that certification does not raise a question about federalization of
corporate law, which concerns when a federal statute assigns traditionally state-law areas such
as corporate governance to a federal agency based on federal standards. Instead, this article is
concerned with when a federal agency is tasked with determining and applying state law.
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law and, unlike federal courts, lack diversity jurisdiction or Eriedriven choice-of-law rules.8 5
However, federal agencies decide state law when it is
incorporated into the federal statute they administer or when the
rules and regulations they are empowered to promulgate include
state-law standards. In the CA, Inc., example above, the SEC itself
allowed exclusion of shareholder proposals based on state law through
its proxy rules. In the case of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"),
state law creates the underlying rights and duties, and federal law
determines the federal tax consequences of these rights and duties.8 6
While it is difficult to generalize about the myriad federal
agencies, this section draws on examples from the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, the SEC, the IRS, and the National Labor
Relations Board to suggest that-although agencies may be thought of
as concerned primarily with the federal statutes and schemes they
administer-certification of state-law issues solves a real problem.
State law arises frequently in the context of some agencies and, even
when it arises less frequently, may raise important state-law
questions.8 7 Moreover, these examples illustrate a certification
problem unique to the agency context. Rather than being restricted to
unresolved state-law questions that arise during formal adjudication,
agencies may also face such questions in the context of informal
action.

A. When FederalAgencies May Determine State Law
A useful starting point for identifying instances of federalagency determination of state law is the example of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), the independent federal

85. Approximately 33 percent of the typical federal court's docket is based on diversity
jurisdiction. See 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 n.77 (3d ed. 2009) ("In the twelve-month period that
ended on March 31, 2007, of the 278,272 civil cases commenced in the district courts 92,557 were
based on diversity. That represents 33.3% of the cases." (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, 44, tbl. C-10 (2007))).
86. Morgan v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
87. Compare N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982)
(expressing outrage when non-Article III bankruptcy courts were empowered to consider statecreated rights and suggesting that administrative agencies "adjudicate only rights of Congress'
own creation"), with Morgan, 309 U.S. at 96-97 (White, J., dissenting) (pointing out that "in the
ordinary bankruptcy proceeding the great bulk of creditor claims are claims that have accrued
under state law prior to bankruptcy-claims for goods sold, wages, rent, utilities, and the like"
and that "the bankruptcy judge is constantly enmeshed in state-law issues").
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agency with jurisdiction over futures trading.88 Like the IRS and SEC,
state-law issues are embedded in the federal scheme the agency
administers, and the agency may address such issues in formal
adjudication or informal action. Beyond this, the CFTC's
determination of state law provided the U.S. Supreme Court an
opportunity to determine the permissible limits of federal agency
adjudication of state-law issues in CFTC v. Schor.89
The CFTC is home to a dispute resolution mechanism called
the Reparations Program.90 The agency provides a forum and a
decisionmaker for resolving disputes between private parties, in
particular "futures customers and commodity futures trading
professionals."91 Although triggered by claims of a violation of a
federal statute or regulations-the Commodity Exchange Act (the
"CEA") or CFTC RuleS92-the statute and rules also allow the CFTC to
hear counterclaims, including state-law counterclaims. 9 3
The CFTC's power to hear such state-law counterclaims was
challenged in CFTC v. Schor on the grounds that the grant of power
violated Article III of the Constitution. 94 At issue was a reparations
complaint by Schor against a commodity futures broker for alleged
88. The CFTC is an independent federal agency created in 1974 through the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCA), which provides,
The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction . .. with respect to accounts,
agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is commonly
known to the trade as, an "option", "privilege", "indemnity", "bid", "offer", "put", "call",
"advance guaranty", or "decline guaranty"), and transactions involving contracts of
sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market
designated or derivatives transaction execution facility registered pursuant to section
7 or 7a of this title or any other board of trade, exchange, or market, and transactions
subject to regulation by the Commission pursuant to section 23 of this title.
7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2006) (amended 2008).
89. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
90. See 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (creating a means to bring claims for damages based on
violations of the Commodity Exchange Act or CFTC Rules and authorizing the CFTC to control
the process); Rules Relating to Reparations, 17 C.F.R. § 12 (2008) (describing the Reparations
Program). See generally Verity Winship, Public Agencies and Investor Compensation:Examples
from the SEC and CFTC, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 137, 147-50 (2009) (detailing the history and
operation of the CFTC's reparations program).
91. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Reparations Program, http://www.
(last visited
cftc.gov/customerprotection/redressandreparations/reparationsprogramlindex.htm
Nov. 10, 2008).
92. See 17 C.F.R. § 12.13 (describing the criteria for filing a reparations complaint with the
CFTC).
93. Id. § 12.19 ("A registrant may, at the time of filing an answer to a complaint, set forth
as a counterclaim . . . (b) Any claim which at the time the complaint is served the registrant has
against the complainant if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence or series of transactions
or occurrences set forth in the complaint.").
94. 478 U.S. 833, 835-36 (1986).
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violations of the CEA. 95 The broker made a counterclaim for the debit
balance, insisting that the debit was a result of Schor's trading and
was a "simple debt owed by Schor."9 6 At the time, the CFTC
regulations allowed the agency to adjudicate all counterclaims
"aris[ing] out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences set forth in the complaint."9 7 In other
words, the CFTC had the rough equivalent of supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims. 98
The Supreme Court concluded that "the limited jurisdiction
that the CFTC asserts over state-law claims as a necessary incident to
the adjudication of federal claims"-the CEA violations-"willingly
submitted by the parties for initial agency adjudication does not
contravene separation of powers principles or Article III."99 Packed
into this conclusion were indications that the Court was swayed by the
consent of the now-complaining party (the counterclaiming party
voluntarily moved its claim to the reparations forum), protections
provided by judicial review ("initial agency adjudication"), and the
continuing centrality of the federal claim.10 0
CFTC v. Schor indicates that federal agencies are
appropriately in the business of making such decisions when they are
"incidental to, and completely dependent upon, adjudication of
reparations claims created by federal law,"10 1 which comports with the
understanding of federal agencies as primarily concerned with
administering federal law. However, the permissible reach of state-

95. Id. at 837-38.
96. Id. at 838.
97. 41 Fed. Reg. 3995 (Jan. 27, 1976); see also 17 C.F.R. §12.19 (2009) (stating that a
counterclaim may include "[any claim which at the time the complaint is served the registrant
has against the complainant if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences set forth in the complaint").
98. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) (allowing federal courts supplemental jurisdiction over
state-law claims that formed part of the same case or controversy as the claim within original
jurisdiction, with a few enumerated exceptions).
99. 478 U.S. at 857.
100. Cf. Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559,
609 (2007) ("Because the adjudicatory powers of federal administrative agencies must be
tethered to the 'execution' of federal law, Congress cannot give such agencies the more general
adjudicatory authority that is often vested in true courts. To take an extreme example, it plainly
would violate the Constitution for Congress to establish a federal administrative tribunal with
conclusive authority to adjudicate run-of-the-mill diversity cases. Indeed, the unconstitutionality
of any such measure is sufficiently clear that Congress has never tried to do so-despite
longstanding concerns about the burdens that diversity cases impose on the Article III courts.").
101. 478 U.S. at 856.
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law decisions by federal agencies is fairly broad and pragmatically
drawn. 102
B. When FederalAgencies Decide Unresolved or Important Questions
of State Law
Federal agencies may decide state-law issues, at least in the
circumstances described by CFTC v. Schor, but more is needed for the
purposes of determining whether a new federal agency certification
procedure is warranted. Federal agencies must be put in the position
of determining the types of state-law questions that are appropriately
certified, primarily those unresolved by the highest state court and
implicating state policies.
The aim of this section is not to give an exhaustive account of
all of the unresolved state-law issues that have arisen or that may
arise in the course of agency activity. Just as in judicial certification,
the argument is not that certifiable questions are ubiquitous or that
all unresolved state-law questions implicate high-profile political
controversies. Judicial certification is neither-it is widely accepted,
03
but not all state-law issues decided by a federal court are certifiable.1
The issues may be settled in state law, unlikely to recur, or may not
implicate important state policies.104 In the context of certification
from federal courts to state courts, some certifiable questions concern
issues such as abortion, while others concern contract interpretation
or the scope of personal jurisdiction. 0 5 The point is that federal agency
consideration of certifiable state-law questions is frequent enough for
states to consider putting in place a flexible mechanism to address
them: namely, federal agency certification.

102. Id. at 857-58; see also AAA & Bros. Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Pioneer Futures, Inc., [Current
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 26,925 (CFTC Dec. 30, 1996) (finding that the
CFTC had jurisdiction over a state-law counterclaim for payment under an indemnification
agreement between parties to reparations proceedings); Simpson v. Office of Thrift Supervision,
29 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Office of Thrift Supervision's determination of
breach of state-law fiduciary duty, which showed the reckless disregard required under federal
law, did not violate Schor).
103. See supra Part I.A.
104. See id.
105. See id.; see also Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial
Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 401 (2000) (noting that
contract law is a large category of certified questions in New York).
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1. The SEC Example
As the single certified question to date illustrates, the federal
securities laws and regulations sometimes put the SEC in the position
of deciding state-law issues.106 One indicator of the frequency of this
occurrence is the extent to which reported decisions by the SEC, both
formal and informal, include consideration of state law. State-law
issues occasionally arise in SEC adjudication. For instance, an SEC
administrative law judge had the occasion to apply state law about
piercing the corporate veil. 107 Moreover, whether a shareholder
proposal may be excluded from a proxy statement will sometimes turn
on its consistency with state law, as it did in CA, Inc. 08 Indeed, the
Director of the Division of Corporate Finance at the SEC identified
certification to the Delaware court as a "very useful tool" for resolving
no-action letters concerning shareholder proposals.1 09
To get a sense of just how frequently these shareholder
proposal no-action letters may give rise to certifiable questions,
consider that, out of the approximately 373 no-action letters issued by
the SEC from October 1, 2007 to October 1, 2008, the SEC had to
determine state law in approximately 32 (or 9 percent)."x0 This
percentage gives a rough estimate of the frequency of state-law issues,
although not all state-law questions are unresolved or otherwise
appropriate for certification, and the percentage may change as the
subject matter of shareholder proposals varies from year to year."'
Another indicator that at least some of these state-law issues are
"certifiable" is that courts have certified questions that also arise in
the no-action context. For instance, a federal court of appeals certified

106. SEC Certification of Questions of Law, supra note 67.
107. Application of Ochanpaugh, Exchange Act Release No. 54,363, 88 SEC Docket 2510
(Aug. 25, 2006).
108. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237, 240 (Del. 2008).
109. John W. White, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Address at the
American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities: Corporation Finance in 2008 - A Year of Progress (Aug. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2008/spch081108jww.htm (calling certification a "very useful
tool" as the division of Corporate Finance "review[s] the hundreds of no-action requests we
receive each year on shareholder proposals").
110. This data comes from a review of the no-action letters posted on the SEC website for
this period. See SEC, Staff No Action, Interpretive and Exemptive Letters, http://www.sec.gov/
interps/noaction.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
111. One year may be dominated by proposals for a shareholder vote on executive pay, for
instance, while proposals to declassify boards of directors predominate during the next. See, e.g.,
RiskMetrics Group, 2008 Post-Season Report Summary, available at http://www.
riskmetrics.com/docs/ 2008postseason review summary (surveying proxy trends).
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to Oklahoma's highest court a question about a particular proposed
bylaw that the SEC has also considered in no-action proceedings. 112
The proxy example is not the only instance in which the federal
securities laws or regulations incorporate state law and put the SEC
in the position of determining state-law issues. For example, some
securities are exempt from federal registration when they are exempt
under the laws of a particular state. 113 Likewise, common trust funds
can avoid classification as investment companies if certain conditions
are met, including that their fees and expenses are "not in
contravention of fiduciary principles established under applicable
federal or state law." 114 State contract law may determine whether a
sale of securities has taken place.115 Finally, collection of penalties
imposed in SEC matters may also depend on state law. 116
Although the number or frequency of state-law issues may be
limited, the SEC example seems to be the type of matter in which one
would want certification: an unresolved, high-stakes corporate law
question. CA, Inc., concerned the relative power of shareholders and
directors, a balance at the heart of U.S. corporate law. 117 Moreover,
states have traditionally been the source of the law governing a
112. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 1999 WL 166041, at *1 (10th
Cir. 1999) (certifying questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court relating to a proposed by-law
that would require a shareholder rights plan to be subject to a shareholder vote); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., Inc., No. 90,185, 1999 WL 35227 (Okla. Jan. 26, 1999)
(answering the certified questions); 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 503 (noting that a question arising
in the SEC no-action process was the same as the one that had been certified to the Oklahoma
court).
113. 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001 (2008); Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues,
Securities Act Release No. 7285, 61 SEC Docket 2049 (May 1, 1996); 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW
OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.16[1] (6th ed. 2009). For small offerings to qualify for an
exemption under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act and SEC Rule 504, issuers must either be
issued under a state-law exemption allowing general solicitation and advertising for sales to
"accredited investors" or they must be registered under a state law requiring public filing and
delivery of a disclosure document. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (2008); Revision of Rule 504 of
Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 7644, 69 SEC Docket 364 (Feb. 25, 1999); MARC I.
STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW § 3.09[1] (4th ed. 2007); 1 HAZEN, supra, at §
4.20[1]; see also STEINBERG, supra, at § 3.11 (describing the "California exception" in which SEC
Rule 1001 exempts from registration "offers and sales up to $5,000,000 that are exempt from
state qualification" under a section of the California Corporations Code).
114. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (2006) (A common trust fund is not an
investment company if, among other requirements, "fees and expenses charged by such fund are
not in contravention of fiduciary principles established under applicable federal or state law.").
115. 2 HAZEN, supra note 113, at § 5.1[7].
116. See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES
OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 35-36, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf
(noting that state law determines when assets are protected under homestead acts and collection
techniques or procedures).
117. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 230-31 (Del. 2008).
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corporation's internal affairs. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized the predominance of state corporate law: "Corporations
are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to
corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal
law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect
to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation."' 18 While Delaware's experiment in agency certification
may seem sui generis because of its special combination of subject
matter and state, it may nonetheless serve as a model for the broader
federal agency certification that this Article proposes.
2. Other Federal Agencies
The extent to which other federal agencies decide issues of
state law is suggested by the role of state law in their federal statutory
and regulatory schemes and the history of agency determinations of
state-law issues.
Some particular areas of the law tend to be defined by state
law. For instance, state-law definitions of family relationships often
underlie determinations of rights or responsibilities in federal law. In
the immigration context, for example, determining whether an
individual is a legitimate child of a U.S. citizen may be part of a
defense to removal or exclusion actions. The defense is that the person
is a U.S. citizen based on birth.119 "Legitimacy" is defined by the law of
the child's or father's residence or domicile, which includes state
law. 1 2 0 Similarly, the Board of Veterans' Appeals is often in the

118. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 84 (1975)); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in
Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAw. 1079,
1079 (2008) (calling himself a "corporate law federalist" who "believes that the internal affairs of
American corporations should continue to be regulated primarily by state law, with the national
or 'federal' government playing a vitally important, complementary role in ensuring that
companies that issue publicly traded securities provide investors with reliable information and
conduct their financial affairs in accordance with accepted accounting standards").
119. See, e.g., In re Joseph Cabilte Anderson, File A035 198 461, 2009 WL 263034 (B.I.A.
Jan. 21, 2009) (denying a motion to cancel removal because petitioner was not a U.S. citizen
based on the requirements of blood relationship and legitimacy); Matter of Wong, No. A12644189, 1963 BIA LEXIS 27, at *4 (B.I.A. May 8, 1963) (applying California law to determine
legitimacy of child).
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (1976) ("The term 'child' means an unmarried person under
twenty-one years of age and includes a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or
domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in the United States or
elsewhere . . . if such legitimation . . . takes place before the child reaches the age of sixteen

years, and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating ...
legitimation.").

parent . . . at the time of such

206

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1:181

position of determining whether someone is a "surviving spouse"
entitled to benefits.1 21 This determination depends in part on state
rules about marriage and, in particular, common law marriage.122
In addition, some agencies are continually involved in
determining state law. The IRS is one such example. As the Supreme
Court made clear years ago: "State law creates legal interests and
rights" while "[t]he federal revenue acts designate what interests or
rights, so created, shall be taxed."123 For example, the IRS looks to the
underlying state law to determine the interests of taxpayers in
property,124 partnerships, and LLC liabilities.125 It also looks to the
state to resolve when "theft" that qualifies for a deduction has
occurred. 126
Another indication that federal agencies are faced with
certifiable questions is the existence of state-law questions that arise
in administrative proceedings and are ultimately certified by a
reviewing court. The point here is not whether federal agency
certification is necessary when the reviewing court can certify a
question-a point taken up below-but rather that, applying the
standards currently applied to judicial certification, certifiable statelaw issues do arise before federal agencies.

121. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006) (defining "marriage" as a marriage valid under "the
law of the place where the parties resided at the time of the marriage or the law of the place
where the parties resided when the rights to benefits accrued."); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(j) (2008)
(defining "marriage" in the same way that 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) defines it).
122. See, e.g., Docket No. 06-17 912, 2007 BVA LEXIS 25776, at *10-11 (B.V.A. Oct. 12,
2007) (applying Iowa state law to determine whether woman who divorced a veteran with
Alzheimer's, allegedly for financial reasons, was in a common law marriage post-divorce and
thus entitled to pension benefits); Docket No. 02-00 859, 2005 BVA LEXIS 110301, at *7 (B.V.A.
Nov. 21, 2005) (considering whether woman was a surviving spouse based on a common law
marriage).
123. Caron, supra note 42, at 782 (quoting Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940)).
Professor Caron points out that, while this aspect of allocation between state and federal law is
long-established, a conflict continues over who should be the "ultimate arbiter of the meaning
and application of state law in a federal tax controversy." Id. at 783. He is concerned in
particular with the degree of deference federal courts should give to lower state court decisions
concerning the particular taxpayer. Id.
124. See, e.g., Ordlock v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 47, 56 (2006), aff'd, 533 F.3d 1136 (2008).
125. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Perler v. Papandon, 331 F.3d 52, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2003)
(noting that state law determines a partner's liability for partnership obligations, including
federal tax liabilities); Rev. Rul. 2004-41, 2004-1 C.B. 845.
126. Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60 ("Ransom payments qualify as a theft loss deduction if
the taking of the money was illegal under the law of the State where it occurred and the taking
was done with criminal intent."). See generally 1988 IRS NSAR 8562 (June 15, 1988) (noting that
"numerous areas of tax law are affected by state law (i.e., alimony, divorce, partnership law,
insurance, and estate tax)" but declining to certify an issue to Montana state court).
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A good example is provided in decisions by the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB"), an independent federal agency, that
determine whether private property rights conflict with rights under
the federal labor laws.127 State law determines the private property
rights, putting the federal administrative agency in the position of
determining the content of state law.128 In Fashion Valley Mall, LLC
v. National Labor Relations Board, for instance, the NLRB had to
decide whether a California shopping mall that prevented a union
from protesting had violated a provision of the labor act defining
unfair labor practices.129 The shopping mall allowed expressive
activity by those who obtained a permit and agreed to abide by the
mall's regulations, including one prohibiting expression that urged
boycotts of mall shops. 30 An administrative law judge found for the
union, and the Board affirmed.131 The basis of the Board's decision
was a holding that California state law allowed "the exercise of speech
and petitioning in private shopping centers, subject to reasonable
time, place, and manner rules adopted by the property owner," but
that the anti-boycott rule was a content restriction and thus not
allowed by California law.132 Requiring the union to adhere to this
127. Glendale Assocs., 335 N.L.R.B. 27, 28 (N.L.R.B. 2001) (determining that prohibitions on
identifying by name the center owner, manager, or any tenant of the shopping center were
content restrictions that could not be imposed under California state law); Bristol Farms, Inc.,
311 N.L.R.B. 437, 438 (N.L.R.B. 1993) ("[W]hen nonemployee union representatives engaging in
Section 7 activity are excluded from private property by an employer possessing a property right
that (aside from any Sec. 7 privilege the union representatives might have to remain on the
property) entitles the employer to exclude them, there is a conflict between the union's Section 7
rights and the employer's property right."). See generally Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State
Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L. REV 891, 905-08 (2006) (criticizing the
NLRB's reliance on state private property rights in its right-to-access inquiries).
128. Bristol Farms, 311 N.L.R.B. at 438 ("To determine whether the Respondent had a
property right entitling it to exclude the union agents from the sidewalk in front of its store, we
must look to the law that created and defined the Respondent's property interest. It is wellestablished that property rights generally are created by state, rather than Federal, law.").
129. Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 451 F.3d 241, 246-47 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that
the union alleged violation of § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, which makes it an
unfair labor practice to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise" of "the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (2006))).
130. 451 F.3d at 242-43.
131. Id. at 243.
132. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the U.S., 343 N.L.R.B. 438, 439 (N.L.R.B. 2004) ("[We
look] to State law to ascertain whether an employer has a property right sufficient to deny access
to nonemployee union representatives. . . . [An employer cannot exclude individuals exercising
Section 7 rights if the State law would not allow the employer to exclude the individuals. . ..
California law permits the exercise of speech and petitioning in private shopping centers, subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner rules adopted by the property owner . . . . Rule 5.6.2,
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unlawful rule amounted to a federal labor law violation. 133 The issue
reached the U.S. Court of Appeals when the shopping mall petitioned
for review, and the Board sought enforcement of its order. 134 The
Court of Appeals then certified to the California Supreme Court the
question of whether California law permitted the shopping mall to
enforce an anti-boycotting rule.135 The California Supreme Court, in
its response, held that the shopping mall could not enforce such a
rule. 136
Similarly, in Waremart Foods v. NLRB, the NLRB had to
resolve two state-law issues. The first issue was whether California
law permitted a grocery store to prevent members of the public from
engaging in expressive activity on an adjacent parking lot and
walkway. The second issue was whether, if they could prevent such
activity, state law made an exception for the distribution of literature
by union leaders. 137 When the grocery store appealed and the NLRB
sued for enforcement, the U.S. Court of Appeals certified the question
to the California Supreme Court,1 8 although that court ultimately
declined to answer. 139
3. The Special Case of Preemption
Finally, federal agencies may be tasked with interpreting state
law when deciding the scope of preemption of state law by federal
administrative regimes. Preemption of state law may occur either by
however, is essentially a content-based restriction and not a time, place, and manner restriction
permitted under California law. . . . [T]he purpose and effect of this rule was to shield [Fashion
Valley's] tenants, such as the Robinsons-May department store, from otherwise lawful consumer
boycott handbilling. Accordingly, we find [Fashion Valley] violated Section 8(a)(1) by
maintaining Rule 5.6.2.") (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Board also held the
Company violated § 8(a)(1) by "requir[ing] [the Union's] adherence to [the] unlawful rule" in its
permit application process. Id. Consequently, the Board ordered Fashion Valley to rescind Rule
5.6.2. Id. at 449.
133. Id.
134. Fashion Valley Mall, 451 F.3d at 242.
135. Id. at 246.
136. Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 855 (Cal. 2007) ("[W]e hold that the
right to free speech granted by . . . the California Constitution includes the right to urge
customers in a shopping mall to boycott one of the stores in the mall.").
137. 333 F.3d 223, 227-28 (D.C. Cir. 2003). An administrative law judge had found for the
union based on the determination that California state law did not allow the grocery store to
exclude union representatives. Waremart Foods, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 701, at *14, *28-30
(N.L.R.B. Sept. 25, 2000), aff'd 337 N.L.R.B. 289, 289 (N.L.R.B. 2001).
138. Waremart Foods, 333 F.3d at 227-28.
139. Waremart Foods v. NLRB, 354 F.3d 870, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Hirsch, supra note 127,
at 914.
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the statute that an agency administers or by regulatory preemptionthe "preemption of state law by regulations promulgated by federal
agencies."140 Regulatory preemption in particular raises complex
issues, including whether an agency's determination that preemption
is appropriate merits Chevron deference. Although an analysis of
preemption's complications is largely beyond the scope of this Article,
a few aspects of preemption, and especially regulatory preemption,
suggest that federal agency certification may be a good mechanism to
promote the cooperative resolution of such issues.
Questions of preemption can be either general or specific. That
is, an agency or a court might have to decide whether the federal
statute or regulations preempt conflicting state law in general or
whether they preempt a specific state law.14 1 This second category
requires the agency to determine the content of state law to evaluate
whether state law "stand[s] as an obstacle to," "impair[s] the efficiency
of," "significantly interfere[s]," "infringe[s]," or "hamper[s]" federal
law.142 Sometimes an argument that federal law preempts state law
arises as a defense, and sometimes agencies permit application by a
state to determine the extent to which state law is preempted.143
While state courts and, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court are
in the position of determining issues of preemption,14 4 questions of
preemption do arise in the agency context in both formal adjudicatory
and informal settings. For instance, in an unpublished interpretive
letter, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency considered
whether application of a state statute to the loans held by certain
banks was preempted by the banks' power under federal law to be

140. Amanda Frost, Judicial Review of FDA Preemption Determinations, 54 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 367, 377-78 (1999); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory
Preemption in PharmaceuticalCases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POLY 1013, 1021
(2007) (describing "federal preemption of state tort liability" as "a dominant issue for the 21st
century").
141. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (2008) (describing the pre-emptive effect of federal regulation of
medical devices); see also Frost, supranote 140, at 367.
142. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1996).
143. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 213.9 (2007) ("A state, through an official having primary
enforcement or interpretive responsibilities for the state consumer leasing law, may apply to the
Board [of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] for a preemption determination."); 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.28 (2009) (detailing the rules for a request for determination that a state law is
"inconsistent" or "substantially the same" in the context of federal Truth in Lending
requirements).
144. See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S.Ct. 538, 551 (2008) (agreeing with the FTC
that neither the Labeling Act's preemption clause nor the FTC's actions preempted a state-law
fraud claim based on advertising for "light" cigarettes).
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trustees. 145 Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission has
determined whether the Communications Act of 1934 preempted
state-law claims related to the bundling of local and long-distance
telephone service in the context of a petition for a declaratory
judgment. 46
Thus, one situation in which agency certification of a state-law
issue would promote cooperative interbranch federalism is when a
federal agency must decide whether the statute it administers or its
regulations preempt state law.147 Certainly the state has a stake in
answering the question; moreover, the issue is recurrent.
Regulations-or their preambles-often expressly state whether the
federal regulations are intended to preempt conflicting state law.148
Indeed, a 1996 Executive Order issued by President Clinton mandated
that a federal regulation "specif[y] in clear language the preemptive
effect, if any, to be given to the law."149
Given that agency certification would be voluntary on both
sides, how certifying. federal agencies and answering state courts
would use the procedure is uncertain, particularly when the agency is
the author of the preemptive federal law, as is the case in regulatory
preemption. Perhaps federal agencies would be unwilling to certify
such preemption questions and, even if they did, state courts might be
reluctant to find preemption. Empirical work to date has suggested
that federal courts are much more likely than state courts to find that
a federal regulation preempts state law,150 although this is not to say

145. O.C.C., Interpretive Letter No. 1016, 2005 WL 475400 (Jan. 14, 2005); see also 12 C.F.R.
34.4 (2009) (noting that "[e]xcept where made applicable by Federal law, state laws that
obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized
real estate lending powers do not apply to national banks").
146. Thorpe v. GTE Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 6371, 6374, 6387 (F.C.C. 2008) (holding that the
Communications Act of 1934 preempted state-law claims concerning whether individual was
required to have long-distance service on her telephone line).
147. Certification would supplement requests for comments, even outside formal notice and
comment requirements, which may further some of the same goals. In Thorpe v. GTE
Corporation,for example, the FCC requested and considered comments from various groups,
including state agencies. Id. at 6374 & nn.27-28.
148. Frost, supra note 140, at 381 (citing Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 158 (1982) (quoting the pre-amble to Federal Home Loan Bank board regulations,
which said that "[flederal [savings and loan] associations shall not be bound by or subject to any
conflicting State law which imposes different ... due-on-sale requirements")); Sharkey, supra note
140, at 227-28.
149. Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,729 (Feb. 5, 1996).
150. Sharkey, supra note 140, at 1017 & n.8.

§

2010]

COOPERATIVE INTERBRANCH FEDERALISM

211

that federal agencies always support preemption. 15 1 Despite these and
other caveats, 152 informed agency decisionmaking about preemption is
particularly crucial and, as such, warrants experimentation.
In sum, because of the variety of federal agency types,
activities, and statutory or regulatory schemes, this area resists
generalization. Nonetheless, the examples above suggest that federal
administrative agencies are often in the position of determining state
law and that, even when these determinations are less frequent, they
may involve important and unresolved state issues. As such, a
practical reason exists for expanding the practice of certification to
federal agencies. The next Part considers the benefits of such an
expansion.
III. How CERTIFICATION PROMOTES
COOPERATIVE INTERBRANCH FEDERALISM

Many of the widely accepted rationales for judicial certification
support agency certification as well. For instance, both mechanisms
exhibit respect for state sovereignty and thus further general values of
federalism and comity. Also, certification takes advantage of state
courts' expertise in state law regardless of whether a court or an
agency certifies the question.
Other rationales are unique to agency certification. Unlike
generalist courts, for instance, federal agencies are expert in
particular subject areas and federal statutes. Chevron deference to
agency statutory interpretations is appropriate, according to the
Supreme Court, because of both the agency's expertise in a "technical
and complex" federal regulatory scheme1 53 and its expertise in
administering its statute, particularly relative to the judiciary's lack of
151. Brief of Former Comm'rs of the FTC as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3,
Altria v. Good et al., 129 S.Ct. 538 (2008) (No. 07-562) (arguing that the FTC had not preempted
state law about cigarette labeling).
152. Another limitation may be that, in some cases, courts actually pass the preemption
decision to the federal agency, so it is unlikely that passing it back through a certification
procedure makes sense. See, e.g., Thorpe, 23 F.C.C.R at 6373-74 (the case was referred to the
Commission from proceedings in federal court on the basis of the primary jurisdiction doctrine);
Petition for Declaratory Ruling on Issues Contained in Count I of White v. GTE, 16 F.C.C.R
11,558, 11,559 (2001) (same); supra Part II.A (discussing the primary jurisdiction doctrine); see
also Wireless Consumers Alliance, 15 F.C.C.R. 17,021, 17,022 (2000) (considering whether the
Communications Act of 1934 preempted state courts from awarding monetary damages against
wireless providers, a question referred to the FCC by the California state court).
153. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (citing
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984)).
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expertise. 154 The flip side of this specialization is that agencies are not
expected to be expert beyond the limits of the statute or subject area
they administer. Nor are they generalists. Accordingly, they may be
less able than federal courts to predict how a state court would decide
an issue. Moreover, allocation from specialized administrative
agencies to state courts may be more pressing than when the
alternatives are a generalist federal court or a state court.
Furthermore, the need for agency certification may be great
precisely because of another difference between agencies and courts:
agencies do not act solely through formal adjudication. Particularly
when agency actions are informal, the mechanism would provide an
important safety valve where judicial review is unavailable as either a
practical or a legal matter.
A. CertificationPreserves State Control over PrimaryConduct
Comity and federalism, or the "spirit of' comity and federalism,
are often given as reasons for federal court certification to state courts,
at least when the question involved impacts state policy. 155 To the
extent that this rationale describes a mechanism through which
federal entities can show respect for state sovereignty, it applies to
any federal certifying entity-whether judicial, administrative, or
something else-and supports the argument that states should adopt
federal agency certification. This section goes beyond this general
concern with comity and federalism to ask what specific state interests
a federal agency certification procedure would protect.
That the state should have the opportunity to declare and to
control the development of state law, particularly when important
state policies are at issue, is often put forward as a compelling reason

154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The certification
procedure is reserved for state law questions that present significant issues, including those with
important public policy ramifications, and that have not yet been resolved by the state courts.
We request certification not because a difficult legal issue is presented but because of deference
to the state court on significant state law matters. . . . We would not presume to certify a run-ofthe mill case to your Court nor would we use the certification process to sidestep our diversity
jurisdiction. In a case such as this one that raises a new and substantial issue of state law in an
arena that will have broad application, the spirit of comity and federalism cause us to seek
certification."); Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 302 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker,
J., dissenting) (asserting that, without certification, federal courts "are forced to make important
state policy, in contravention of basic federalism principles").
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for judicial certification.1 56 Sometimes it is referred to as a concern
with preserving state "control" of the content and development of its
own law. "Control" in this context does not mean, however, that the
certifying court or agency would otherwise impose particular content
on the state. A decision of state law by a federal agency or federal
court does not bind the state-the highest state court is free to
disregard the federal entity's prediction and come to a different
conclusion. 15 7
So what does "control" mean in this context? In the case of a
certifying federal agency or court, certification enhances the "control"
of state courts by affording the state additional opportunities to
address state-law questions.1 5 8 Moreover, agency decisions of state law
will influence the primary behavior of both the individuals and
entities directly subject to the agency's decision as well as, more
generally, those who shape their conduct in response to agency
interpretations. The concern with control arises primarily when the
federal entity incorrectly predicts how the highest state court would
resolve a question of state law. In other words, because decisions of
state law by federal courts or agencies do not bind the state court, the
federal judge's or agency's educated guess (or, in Court of Appeals
Judge Sloviter's words, the "Erie guess" 159) may turn out to be "wrong"
in the sense that a state court ultimately comes out another way. This
problem is sometimes described as one of forecasting or prediction. 160
A concern with incorrect predictions, whether by federal
agencies or federal courts, is that they "inequitably affect the losing
federal litigant who cannot appeal the decision to the state supreme

156. See, e.g., Corr & Robbins, supra note 15, at 416-17 (arguing that certification promotes
state autonomy by allowing federal courts to avoid their duty to resolve questions of state law in
narrow circumstances).
157. Cf. Nash, supranote 39, at 1098 (observing that only the highest state court can make a
"definitive" ruling of state law under Erie).
158. Cf. id. at 1697 (suggesting that judicial certification "gives the state judiciary the
opportunity to rule on important issues of state law in cases in which it might not otherwise have
had the chance").
159. Sloviter, supra note 38, at 1679.
160. Interestingly, based on this idea that the number of educated guesses should be
reduced, one commentator has argued that courts should certify questions to federal agencies
given that the courts' statutory interpretations will often be non-binding after the Supreme
Court's decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet
Services. See Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw. U. L.
REV. 997, 1001-02 (2007) (pointing out the difficulty federal courts may experience when faced
with "applying ambiguous state law which they [cannot] authoritatively construe" and arguing
that similar problems arise where federal courts must rule on matters within the agency
expertise before the agency has expressed its views on the matter).
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court" and "skew the decisions of persons and businesses who rely on
them."' 6 1 First, the federal agency decision of state law will influence
and shape the primary conduct of the parties directly involved, such
as the CA, Inc., shareholder making the proposal and the corporation
itself. The litigants may be frustrated if they are subject to a decision
that is later found to be an incorrect interpretation of state law-a
"ticket for one ride only."162 Second, the agency's decision of state law
may shape primary conduct beyond that of the individuals or entities
directly involved, reaching those who follow statements of
commissioners, amicus briefs, litigation positions, and other agency
actions which, although non-binding, are influential.163
Furthermore, there is reason to think that federal agencies
make incorrect predictions. Federal courts have often incorrectly

161. Sloviter, supra note 38, at 1681. Other concerns with incorrect predictions focus on the
impact on the federal entity or the legal system more generally. Former New York Chief Justice
Judith Kaye suggested that incorrect predictions embarrass judges. Kaye & Weissman, supra
note 105, at 378. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, "[t]he reign of law is hardly
promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is ... supplanted by a controlling decision of
a state court." R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). A related concern
that does not apply to the agency context is that the failure of federal courts to certify open state
law questions promotes forum shopping that ultimately may impede the development of state
law in that area. See McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157-58 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting) (developing this argument).
162. See, e.g., John R. Brown, Certification- Federalismin Action, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 455, 456
(1977) (noting the frustration of litigants when the rule of law announced by the federal court
turns out to be "a ticket for one ride only"); W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257,
264 (10th Cir. 1967) (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting) (advocating certification because
federal courts do litigants injustice by making decision that state court later overrules). But see
Selya, supra note 5, at 690 (pointing out that in many instances no relief is available to parties
where - in hindsight - their case was wrongly decided: "[S]uch a litigant is no more greatly
disadvantaged than a litigant who loses in a lower state court and is thereafter denied
discretionary review, only to have the state's high court decide the issue favorably in some other
case at a later date. By like token, such a litigant is no worse off than a litigant who loses on a
federal-law issue in a federal court, only to have the court admit the error of its ways in
subsequent litigation.").
163. For example, although technically non-binding, SEC no-action letters provide a
relatively well-developed source of interpretations of the securities laws. See Thomas P. Lemke,
The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW. 1019, 1019-20 (1987) ("Because no-action
letters represent the views of those who administer the federal securities laws on a daily basis,
they have assumed a significant degree of importance to practitioners, especially in light of the
relative dearth of case law or formal Commission interpretations on many aspects of these laws.
Indeed, on a significant number of the more complex aspects of the federal securities laws, noaction letters are the sole body of precedent. As a result, experienced practitioners recognize staff
no-action letters as an essential resource for advising clients as to the proper interpretation of
the law."); Nagy, supra note 75, at 924 (discussing the widespread reliance on no-action letters
by courts, practitioners, and their clients).
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predicted the stance of the highest state court, 164 and there is no
reason to believe that federal agencies would be better at predicting
state law than federal courts. In fact, federal agencies may very well
be worse at predicting state law. They focus on the specialized area
they administer, whereas federal courts are expected to be generalists.
Moreover, some commentators have suggested that agencies interpret
statutes in a fundamentally different way than courts, with more
sensitivity to executive directives and the policy context. 6 5 If the
agency uses different interpretive tools than the state court, it may be
less able to predict its decision than a federal court, which uses the
same approach.
Finally, rather than predict state law, agencies may simply
decline to decide unresolved issues of state law. So, for instance, the
SEC has indicated that it will refrain from issuing a no-action letter
concerning a shareholder proposal in the proxy context in the absence
of resolved state law. 166 Rather than reduce the need for a federal
agency certification procedure, however, the SEC's abstention raises
problems akin to that of abstention in the judicial process. In effect, it

164. See, e.g., Corr & Robbins, supra note 15, at 415 n.11 (1988) (citing cases in which federal
courts incorrectly predicted state law); Kaye & Weissman, supra note 105, 378 n.28 (citing
commentators who have discussed federal courts' incorrect predictions of state law); Sloviter,
supra note 38, at 1679-80 (listing instances in which the state court did not come out the way
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had predicted).
165. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 535 (2005) (comparing
agency interpretations "based on text, legislative history, statutory history, past agency practice,
the balance of competing congressional purposes, and industry or scientific understandings" with
"judicial approaches based on pure textual analysis, plain meaning or the invocation of
grammatical rules"); Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 104-05 (2009) (arguing that agencies are in a better
position to interpret statutes in light of their purpose than are courts).
166. See SEC Certification of Questions of Law, supra note 67 ("The Division, faced with two
conflicting opinions on Delaware law from Delaware law firms, does not resolve disputed
questions of Delaware law. If there is no way to obtain any such resolution, the Division intends
to inform CA that it has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating that it may exclude the
AFSCME Proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) or Rule 14a-8(i)(2)."); Bank of America Corp., SEC NoAction Letter, 2009 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 57, at *5--7 (Feb. 11, 2009) ("The Division has repeatedly
refused to issue no action relief based on unsettled issues of state law." (citing PLM Int'l, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 219918, at *1 (Apr. 28 1997) ("The staff notes in particular that
whether the proposal is an appropriate matter for shareholder action appears to be an unsettled
point of Delaware law. Accordingly, the Division is unable to conclude that rule 14a-8(c)(1) may
be relied upon as a basis for excluding that proposal from the Company's proxy materials."))); see
also Exxon Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 43435, at 10 (Feb. 28, 1992) (concluding that
the SEC Division of Corporation Finance cannot conclude that state law prohibits the bylaw
when no judicial decision squarely supports that result).
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prefers one "party," the shareholder proposal's proponent,167 and forces
further procedures if any relief is to be had.

B. CertificationAllocates DecisionmakingAccording to Institutional
Expertise
The argument that state courts are institutionally apt for
deciding state law boils down to the idea that state courts, through
repeated application of state law, have become particularly expert. 168
The Delaware Supreme Court is only an extreme example of this-it is
specialized not only in Delaware state law but, even more specifically,
in Delaware corporate law. The state court's expertise in state law
does not vary depending on whether a federal court or agency is
raising the state-law question. Thus, a state that accepts this
rationale for judicial certification should also accept it in the federal
agency context. Moreover, the particular state-law questions that
come up in the agency context are within this area of specialization.
The above examples of agencies' determinations of state law show that
at least some of the state-law issues that have arisen or may arise in
agency matters are ones that could arise in state-court adjudication. 16 9
The highest state court is also "better" at deciding unresolved
issues of state law because it has more room for judgment and for
being sensitive to important state policies or legal frameworks. 170 In
contrast, the federal agency or court is in the position of parsing and
predicting state law. Where the highest state court has clearly spoken,
the federal entity simply follows that precedent, acting as another
state court would. 171 When the state law is unsettled or when only
lower court opinions are available, federal courts or agencies are put

167. See Robert B. Thompson, Defining the Shareholder's Role, Defining a Role for State
Law; Folk at 40, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 771, 783 (2008) (" 'If the staff receives dueling opinions of
counsel on state law,' as to whether a particular proposal is a proper subject of action for
shareholders, which is a likely occurrence, the SEC 'ha[s] traditionally deferred to the proponent
.... " (quoting John W. White, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address at the
American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities: Corporation Finance in 2008 - A Year of Progress (Aug. 11, 2008))), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2008/spchO81108jww.htm).
168. Cochran, supranote 1, at 159, 160 n.14.
169. See supra Part II.
170. See, e.g., Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 668 S.E.2d 798, 800 (S.C. 2008) ("In
answering a certified question raising a novel question of law, this Court is free to decide the
question based on its assessment of which answer and reasoning would best comport with the
law and public policies of the state as well as the Court's sense of law, justice, and right.").
171. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (observing that a federal court must act
as "another court of the State").
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into the position of predicting the content of the state law. As Judge
Friendly observed in the context of judicial certification, "[o]ur
principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine
what the New York courts would think the California courts would
think on an issue about which neither has thought."172 In sum, the job
of prediction is quite different from the job of a state court that must
address an open question: the federal court or agency must parse the
state decisions, while the state court may appropriately reason in
terms of policy and common sense.173
State court expertise is not considered in a vacuum, however.
Certification is worth the trouble only if the states are more expert
than the certifying entity. In the context of judicial certification, a
federal court may not have developed expertise in a particular body of
state law in the way a state court has, but its function as a generalist
court has prepared it for the task of analyzing precedents and
applying them to the facts before it. After all, one premise of diversity
jurisdiction is that the federal court is perfectly capable of determining
state law. 174
The institutional expertise justification for interbranch
certification is more compelling than that for federal court / state court
certification because the federal agency's raison d'etre is to be the
expert administrator of a specialized subject area and a particular
federal statute and regulations. An agency's expertise in a single area
cuts against its effectiveness in interpreting state law. It is not
expected to be expert outside of its specialized area. Moreover, a
federal agency is expert in a national scheme and does not have a
similar depth of expertise in fifty different bodies of state law.175 Nor
is it expected to be a generalist, applying broad principles of law that
cross subject areas. Further, if a federal agency takes into account
172. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 105, at 378 (quoting Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276
F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960)).
173. Id. at 377 (" 'Whereas the highest court of the state can 'quite acceptably ride along a
crest of common sense, avoiding the extensive citation of authority,' a federal court often must
exhaustively dissect each piece of evidence thought to cast light on what the highest state court
would ultimately decide." (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW
142 (1973))).
174. Cf. Nash, supra note 39, at 1872 (arguing that, "as the constitutional inclusion and the
continued congressional authorization of federal diversity jurisdiction suggest, it may well be
that state courts' susceptibility to bias against out-of-state parties renders them less able than
federal courts to resolve state law questions 'correctly' ").
175. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 127, at 909 (noting that the expertise of the National Labor
Relations Board "is solely in federal labor law and does not include the vagaries of over fifty
different property regimes" and concluding that its decisions that depend on state property law
take longer to resolve than its other unfair labor practice decisions).
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policy and executive branch directives in a way that makes its process
of interpretation differ fundamentally from that of a court,176 it may be
even less capable of acting in the shoes of a state court interpreting
state law.
C. CertificationSpeeds Review of State-Law Determinationsand
Provides Recourse in Otherwise UnreviewableAgency Actions
Unlike federal courts, agencies act not only through formal
adjudication, but also through rulemaking and through informal
action-a residual category that captures the wide variety of agency
activities that are neither formal adjudication nor formal
rulemaking.177 Whereas courts resolve adversary proceedings,
agencies may act through "legislative rules, interpretive rules,
statements of policy, manual issuances, advisory opinions, letters,
press releases, after dinner speeches, formal adjudications, informal
adjudications, interpretive memoranda, guidelines, 'rulings,' " and
other forms. 178 The rationale for and appropriateness of federal agency
certification depends on the context in which the state-law issue arises
and also on the availability of judicial review. As many commentators
have noted, divisions between adjudication and rulemaking and
between formal and informal proceedings are far from clear in fact or
in law,179 but this lack of clarity does not preclude some general
observations about why federal agency certification might be desirable
in the various contexts and how such certification might work.
Certification's role in agency adjudication, defined broadly as
the "determination of individual rights or duties," 80 depends on the
availability of judicial review. When judicial review-and with it,
potential judicial certification from the reviewing court-is available,
agency certification speeds the resolution of the state-law issue. When
176. Cf. Mashaw, supra note 165, at 524-25 (noting the difficulty in identifying how agencies
interpret statutes).
177. See, e.g., William J. Lockhart, The Origin and Use of 'Guidelines for the Study of
Informal Action in Federal Agencies', 24 ADMIN. L. REV. 167, 174 (1972) (defining informal
agency action as executive branch action "other than formal adjudication or rulemaking").
178. Mashaw, supranote 165, at 525.
179. See, e.g., Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park's Requirement of
Judicial Review "On the Record", 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 180-81 (noting that "ambiguities . .
. blur even [the] most basic distinctions" of "the law governing federal administrative
procedure"); cf. Antonin Scalia, Speech at Duke University School of Law, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, in 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 511 ("Administrative law is not
for sissies.").
180. CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 45 (2d ed. 1997).
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judicial review is unavailable as either a practical or legal matter,
agency certification may provide a check on agency decisionmaking.
Judicial review potentially reduces the need for a separate
agency certification process because the reviewing court may use the
well-established judicial certification mechanism to certify an
unresolved or important state-law issue to the relevant state court. On
appeal from the National Labor Relations Board, for example, federal
courts have certified questions of state law to the highest California
state court.18 1 Such judicial review is widely available: the
Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of agency
action in most, but not all cases. 182
Even when judicial review is available as a legal matter,
however, federal agency certification may be the only practical way for
the issue of state law to reach an expert court. Judicial review is rare,
in part because it depends on an issue's reaching the highest levels
inside an agency. In the SEC no-action context, for instance, the
availability of judicial review depends on whether the Commission
agrees to review the SEC staffs decision. 183 If it does, then judicial
review is available, but Commission review is infrequent and of
limited value, as a practical matter, because of time and expense. 184
Similarly, in CFTC reparations proceedings, judicial review is
available only of orders of the Commission. 185
181. Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 451 F.3d 241, 242-43 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (certifying
question to California Supreme Court on appeal-and seeking enforcement-from NLRB);
Waremart Foods v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 223, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same).
Federal courts have also certified state-law questions on appeals from bankruptcy
proceedings and actions challenging IRS determinations. See In re Krause, 546 F.3d 1070, 1071
(9th Cir. 2008) (certifying a question to the Nevada Supreme Court on bankruptcy appeal); Imel
v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102, 1116 (D. Colo. 1974) (certifying a state-law issue underlying
federal tax determination); Estate of Madsen v. Comm'r, 659 F.2d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1981)
(certifying to the state high court the question of whether "a life insurance policy naming the
deceased spouse as the insured and the surviving spouse as beneficiary and owner . . . [was]
separate property of the surviving spouse" although "the premiums were paid out of community
funds").
182. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (stating general rule that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof"). But see id. § 701(a) (listing exceptions to
the general rule).
183. Lemke, supra note 163, at 1039-40.
184. Id. at 1040. A shareholder proponent might alternatively seek an injunction in federal
district court. See, e.g., Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 562 (D.D.C. 1985)
(shareholder successfully sought preliminary injunction in federal court).
185. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18(e) ("Review. Any order of the Commission entered hereunder shall be
reviewable on petition of any party aggrieved thereby, by the United States Court of Appeals for
any circuit in which a hearing was held, or if no hearing was held, any circuit in which the
appellee is located .... .").
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Federal agency certification still has a role when judicial
review is available legally and practically: it enables more timely
resolution of unresolved state-law issues. Just as certification was
welcomed as a sensible alternative to abstention that "saved time,
energy and resources," 186 federal agency certification may be a
practical and speedier alternative to waiting for judicial review and
access to judicial certification.187 This process includes more than just
delay; it may result in potentially unnecessary proceedings in the
reviewing court and block any settlement efforts. 88 Rather than
making agency certification unnecessary altogether, the availability of
judicial review should inform the decisions of the certifying agency
and the answering court to certify or to answer.
In the absence of judicial review, certification introduces a
check on agency action. The scope of this category of unreviewable
agency actions is debated and has shifted over time. Whatever its
contours, courts have found certain agency action to be unreviewable,
either because the relevant statute is explicit about the lack of judicial
review or because the action has been "committed to agency discretion
by law."189 Until 1988, for instance, actions by what was then the
Veterans Administration (including benefit determinations turning on
state-law marital status) were insulated from judicial review by
statute. 90 In the category of actions "committed to agency discretion,"
186. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) ("[I1n the long run
[certification] save[s] time, energy, and resources . . . ."); Lawrence L. Piersol, Certifying
Questions to State Supreme Courts as a Remedy to the Abstention Doctrine, 9 S.D. L. REV. 158,
167-68 (1964) (discussing delay, expense, and lack of guidance as three distinct problems of
abstention).
187. A similar criticism-that the inability of lower courts to certify questions to state courts
slows and/or multiplies litigation-has been made in the context of certification procedures that
allow only the courts of appeals and not the district courts to certify such questions. See Sloviter,
supra note 38, at 1686 ("In those jurisdictions where certification is available to the federal
appellate courts but not to the federal district courts, litigants are forced to go through the entire
trial process and initiate an appeal before they can request a state determination. As a result, an
entire trial may be rendered meaningless, efforts to settle may be frustrated, and the docket of
the federal appeals court may be enlarged unnecessarily.").

188. Id.
189. Administrative Procedure Act § 701(a) (exempting agency action from judicial review "to
the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law'); see also Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative
Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990) (discussing the scope of the "committed to agency discretion"
category).
190. See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982) ("[The decision of the Administrator on any question of
law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for
veterans and their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or
any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an
action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise."); Barton F. Stichman, The Veterans' Judicial
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the Supreme Court found that an agency's refusal to initiate
proceedings
was
presumptively
unreviewable. 19 1 In
these
circumstances, federal agency certification allows review of a
particular state-law issue, even if full-fledged judicial review is
unavailable. At the same time, the fact that agency certification is
narrower in scope than judicial review preserves discretion and
flexibility in the agency-the reasons why informal action is permitted
and why so much agency work depends on it.192 Federal agency
certification also gives the agency a mechanism for seeking expert
resolution of an issue that is simply unresolved or controversial and
particularly linked to state policy decisions.
Although the proposed certification procedure focuses on
formal and informal agency adjudication, agencies also act through
rulemaking. Rulemaking defines the outer limits of agency
certification. Specific state-law issues are unlikely to arise in this
context because federal administrative agencies lack the power to
prescribe the content of state law through rulemaking. Even when
agencies make determinations that affect or interact with state law
(such as when a federal agency determines the preemptive force of a
federal statute or regulation on state law1 9 3), certification would be
analogous to the situation where a legislature asks a court for its
opinion on a legal matter pending before it. This situation should
sound familiar: rather than speaking of this process as "certification,"
it is usually termed an "advisory opinion." As detailed below, the
issuance of such opinions by courts is generally impermissible both in
the federal system and in the majority of states. Accordingly,
certification from an agency when it is acting in its rulemaking
capacity is outside the scope of the proposed agency certification,
which focuses instead on agency adjudication of varying degrees of
formality.
In sum, federal agency certification has two functions when the
agency undertakes adjudication, whether formal or informal. Where
judicial review is available, the eventual availability of judicial
certification may at times provide another route to state-court
determination of unresolved state-law questions. But by no means
Review Act of 1988: Congress Introduces Courts and Attorneys to Veterans' Benefits Proceedings,
41 ADMIN. L. REV. 365, 366 (1989).
191. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).

192. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail that Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex
Ante Constraints on Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1057, 1058, n.7 (2004) (estimating
that more than 90 percent of agency activity is informal).
193. See supra Part II.B.3.
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does it always do so, given variations in the function and frequency of
judicial review of the particular agency's adjudications. Accordingly,
federal agency certification may be appropriate where it leads to faster
and more streamlined resolution. Where judicial review is
unavailable, certification introduces a check on agency action by
involving the courts in at least one stage of the proceedings.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION

This Part considers how a federal agency certification
procedure may be implemented. It describes the main difficulties with
implementation: (1) the concern that a court answering a certified
question is in the position of issuing an advisory opinion, (2) the fear
that agencies may be engaged in inappropriate subdelegation by
passing one of their responsibilities along to state courts, and (3) the
difficulty of separating state- and federal-law issues. Finally, this Part
details the certification procedure this Article proposes in light of
these concerns and examines how this expansion would alter the
existing legal landscape.
A. Advisory Opinions Objection
Critics of interbranch certification may argue that answering
certified questions amounts to issuing advisory opinions. Advisory
opinions are given by courts in response to "questions of law that
neither arise from actual litigation nor involve private rights,"194
usually to another branch of government. 195 In the federal system,
Article III's "case or controversy" requirement has been read to
prohibit advisory opinions1 96 and the majority of states also prohibit
their courts from issuing advisory opinions.197 They are disfavored
because questions giving rise to advisory opinions may be too abstract;
advisory opinions are not the product of an adversarial process, which
194. Gerald M. Levin, Note, Inter-JurisdictionalCertification: Beyond Abstention Toward
CooperativeJudicialFederalism, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 344, 356 (1963).
195. See also Charles M. Carberry, Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 81 (1976) (describing an advisory opinion as an "answer given by the
justices of a state's highest court acting in their individual capacities, at the request of a
coordinate branch of government, to a legal question regarding a matter pending before the
requesting authority").
196. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968).
197. Jonathan D. Persky, Note, "Ghosts That Slay" A Contemporary Look at State Advisory
Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155, 1181 (2005) (listing ten states that allow their courts to issue
advisory opinions).
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may cause a lack of concreteness; and opinions on proposed legislation
may trigger separation of powers concerns if giving such opinions is
not a judicial function and interferes with the legislature.1 9 8 As the
Supreme Court put it in Flast v. Cohen, "the rule against
advisory opinions . . . recognizes that such suits often 'are not pressed

before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a
question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a
clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted
situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests.' "199
The states that allow advisory opinions do so in limited
contexts and to a limited set of entities or people, not including federal
agencies or even state agencies. For instance, Rhode Island's
constitution requires "[tjhe judges of the supreme court to give their
written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested by the
governor or by either house of the general assembly."200 Delaware
permits advisory opinions by statute, 201 and this statute has been
found not to violate the separation of powers. 202 Nonetheless, the
categories of advisory opinions are limited primarily to constitutional
questions, 203 and the category of those who can receive advisory
opinions is limited to the governor and governing assembly. 204
Moreover, the statutory allowance for advisory opinions has been read

198. Id.; see also Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002,
1005-07 (1924) (describing the constitutional and statutory problems with the advisory opinion
process); George Neff Stevens, Advisory Opinions - Present Status and an Evaluation, 34 WASH.
L. REV. & ST. B.J. 1, 8 (1959) (listing reasons that states have rejected the advisory opinion
process).
199. Flast, 392 U.S. at 96-97 (quoting United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961));
see also Stevens, supranote 198, at 8 (explaining that state courts that have rejected an advisory
opinion process have done so in part because there were "no parties before the court and
therefore nothing to adjudicate").
200. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3 (internal quotations omitted); see also Persky, supra note 197, at
1160-61 (describing Rhode Island's use of advisory opinions).
201. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 141 (2008).
202. In re Opinions of Justices, 88 A.2d 128, 139 (Del. 1952).
203. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 141 ("§ 141. Advisory opinions of Justices upon request of
Governor and General Assembly (a) The Justices of the Supreme Court, whenever the Governor
of this State or a majority of the members elected to each House may by resolution require it for
public information, or to enable them to discharge their duties, may give them their opinions in
writing touching the proper construction of any provision in the Constitution of this State, or of
the United States, or the constitutionality of any law or legislation passed by the General
Assembly, or the constitutionality of any proposed constitutional amendment which shall have
been first agreed to by two-thirds of all members elected to each House.").
204. Id.; see, e.g., Opinions of the Justices, 88 A.2d 128 (issuing an advisory opinion on
whether a particular section of the Delaware code was constitutional and thus the Delaware
Attorney General could investigate a charge of vote buying in an election).
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narrowly as outside the normal activities of the judiciary. 205 Delaware
courts and judges have, however, been unusually willing to provide
advice to various constituencies through dictum, speeches, articles,
and other writings. 206
One possible approach to instituting federal agency
certification is to concede that answers to certified questions may be
advisory opinions and to modify or eliminate the state ban on advisory
opinions. In fact, Florida did exactly that when confronted with the
argument that judicial certification resulted in advisory opinions,
announcing that the state constitution permitted advisory opinions. 207
The assertion of state control over primary conduct or the introduction
of a level of input into informal proceedings determining state law
might be compelling reasons for a state to do so.
In the absence of such modification of the state's advisory
opinion practices, the advisory opinion concern is least troubling in the
context of formal agency adjudication for the same reasons it is no
longer a live issue in the judicial certification context. The question of
whether answers to certified questions are impermissible advisory
opinions is not a new one: it arose as states developed processes to
accept certified questions from courts. Indeed, some commentators
have suggested that this objection to court certification was the most
serious one raised in early years. 208 Nonetheless, most courts have
rejected the advisory opinion concern, although for varied reasons. 209
The certifying court-like an adjudicating agency-considers "a
genuine live controversy between the parties" that is "based upon an
existing factual situation which will be determined by [the court's]
response to questions." 210 Moreover, the requirement that the state205. Opinion of the Justices, 413 A.2d 1245, 1251 (Del. 1980).

206. Steven J. Cleveland, Process Innovation in the Production of CorporateLaw, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1829, 1846-59 (2008); see also id. at 1859-61 (suggesting that the separation of
powers concerns usually raised by such advice are less troubling in the Delaware context because
Delaware's part-time legislature has delegated governance of corporate law to the specialized
courts in a way analogous to congressional delegation to federal agencies).
207. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 739-43 (Fla. 1961).
208. Corr & Robbins, supra note 15, at 419 ("Probably the most damaging argument against
the use of certification is the claim that certified questions seek advisory opinions from the state
courts.").
209. See, e.g., In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966) (rejecting the argument that answers
to certified questions were advisory opinions when considering the power of Maine's highest
court to consider certified questions); Corr & Robbins, supra note 15, at 419-22 (describing the
various responses of state courts to the argument that answers to certified questions were
advisory opinions); Kaye & Weissman, supra note 105, at 394 & n.125.
210. Richards, 223 A.2d at 832; see also Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149,
151 (Kan. 1980) (reasoning that the certification procedure did not generate advisory opinions
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law issue be "dispositive" or "determinative" ensures that the opinion
issued by the state court is tightly linked to the case or controversy
before the certifying court or adjudicating body. 211 Finally, the state
court's decision is binding on the federal court (or at least treated as
such because of Erie212) and is likely to be treated as binding on the
adjudicating agency. For many courts considering judicial certification
procedures, these reasons were enough to overcome the advisory
opinion objection. 213
Agency reliance on informal action poses more of a problem for
certification procedures because, as the context for certification
departs from formal litigation, the answers to certified questions are
more easily characterized as advisory opinions. For agencies, a
certifiable question often arises not in litigation or formal
adjudication, but rather during informal proceedings, making it
difficult to argue that the certifying entity is deciding a case or
controversy to which the answering court is providing a determinative
or dispositive element. Nonetheless, interbranch certification in
agency informal action may rely on other characteristics of the
certification process to avoid being characterized as advisory opinions,
particularly when the informal action includes characteristics of
adjudication such as the presence of adverse parties with an interest
in the dispute. 214 These interested parties may present the argument
in front of the answering court; as in the case when judicial
certification was challenged, the fact that "[p]arties are before the
court and are provided with the opportunity for presentation of briefs
and oral argument customary upon appeal" helped ensure that the

because the question "arises from an actual case and controversy and although presented as a
question of law, it neither violates the case or controversy requirement nor the separation of
powers doctrine on advisory opinions"); Wolner v. Mahaska Indus., Inc., 325 N.W.2d 39, 40
(Minn. 1982) (rejecting argument that answers to certified questions are advisory opinions); Corr
& Robbins, supranote 15, at 421 (quoting the Spencer court's reasoning).
211. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 105, at 378.
212. As to whether the decision was binding on the federal courts, the court relied on Erie to
make the answer to the certified question "conclusive" and "determinative" in the federal courts
with respect to Maine's state law. Id. at 393.
213. Corr & Robbins, supra note 15, at 455 (surveying state and federal judges in 1985 and
finding that the tight connection to the federal case minimized concern that answers to certified
questions were advisory opinions); Levin, supra note 194, at 357 ("Most significantly, that
answer will determine the rights of federal court parties, will have res judicata and stare decisis
effect, and will authoritatively settle state law on the question.").
214. Of. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (isting aspects of adjudication that
need to be present in an administrative proceeding for the administrative decision to have
preclusive effect).
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question was concrete and subject to an adversarial process. 215
Furthermore, as with judicial certification, stare decisis and
preclusion rules will apply, binding the state court and the parties in
front of it once the state court has answered a certified question. 216 In
sum, the strength of the argument that an answer to a certified
question amounts to an advisory opinion may depend on the particular
characteristics of the agency's informal action, but as long as the
answering state court is considering a defined question with advocates
on either side, the existence of formal federal litigation is not
dispositive.
The no-action process that gave rise to the SEC's certified
question to the Delaware court is a good example of informal agency
action that has many of the attributes of adjudication. 217 The no-action
letters-no matter how influential in practice-merely announce that
the SEC staff does not plan to take enforcement action based on the
activity described in the request for the letter. They do not prevent the
parties either from seeking other relief or from excluding the
provisions from the proxy materials and taking their chances as to
enforcement action. 218 In fact, the SEC has reserved the right to take
enforcement action even if it has issued a no-action letter announcing
that it would not do so. 2 1 9 However, the SEC no-action letter at issue
in CA, Inc., featured opposing "parties" (the shareholder proponent
and the company) and a third-party adjudicator. 220 Not only did the
two sides make competing submissions before the SEC, but they also
contested the issue in the state court proceeding after the question

215. Richards,223 A.2d at 832.
216. Levin, supra note 194, at 357.
217. See supra Part I.B.2.
218. See New York City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995) (ruling that a
no action letter" is an interpretive rule and does not carry the force of law); Administrative
Proceedings Instituted Morgan Stanley & Co, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 28,990, 1991 SEC
LEXIS 409, *3 (Mar. 20, 1991) (noting that no-action letters "are not rulings of the Commission
or its staff on questions of law or fact"); MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW §
2.04[B] (4th ed. 2007); Lemke, supra note 163, at 1019 nn.1, 3 (noting that, according to the
Commission, no-action letters "only purport to represent the views of the officials who give them"
or "set forth staff positions only" that "are not rulings of the Commission or its staff on questions
of law or fact").
219. ROBERT J. HAFT & MICHELLE H. HUDSON, ANALYSIS OF KEY SEC No-ACTION LETTERS §
6.2 (2006) (recognizing that SEC no-action letters are merely informal views and that future
enforcement action is not precluded). There are practical reasons for the agency not to exercise
this power, but it reserves this right.
220. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 230 (Del. 2008).
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was certified. 22 1 Moreover, CA, Inc., resulted in a state court decision
with the usual force of law. 2 22
Finally, states may consider a pragmatic response to the
concern that advisory opinions issued by the state court would offend
the separation of powers. In some states, including Delaware, advisory
opinions are not issued by the court, but rather by individual judgeS223
-although the authority and usefulness of such advisory opinions
certainly come from the judges' official position. 224 Where the reasons
for allowing certification are compelling, some states may be willing to
accept this pragmatic solution.

B. Agency Authority to Certify
The flip side of the objection to the power of the state to accept
certified questions from federal agencies is the concern with the power
of the agency to certify. In other words, is certification of state-law
questions to state courts an appropriate subdelegation by federal
agencies? 225
Courts
have
invalidated
subdelegation
by
federal
administrative agencies to outside parties, including state entities,
because of a concern that "lines of accountability may blur,
undermining an important democratic check on government decisionmaking"226 or that "these parties will not share the agency's 'national
vision and perspective'. . . and thus may pursue goals inconsistent
with those of the agency and the underlying statutory scheme." 227
However, federal agency certification differs from the type of
subdelegation that has been successfully challenged. After the state
court has decided the issue of state law, the matter returns to the
221. Id.
222. Id. at 240.
223. Opinion of the Justices, 413 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Del. 1980) ("We have emphasized that
opinions given by the Justices 'administratively' under the [state advisory opinion] Statute are
non-adjudicative expressions of personal points of view .... .").
224. Id. ("Such opinions are different and useful, and, properly understood, they are
authoritative for one reason: the persons giving them are the members of the highest Court of
this State and, in effect, are what one would expect the Justices to say if the issue had been
presented to them in litigation.").
225. Cf. C. Steven Bradford, The SEC's New Regulation CE Exemption: Federal-State
Coordination Run Rampant, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 429, 437-39 (1998) (suggesting that
incorporating a state-law exception into SEC rules is arguably unconstitutional). Section 4A of
the Exchange Act permits some delegation, but not to state courts.
226. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565-66 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
227. Id. (quoting Nat'l Park & Conservation Ass'n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D.D.C.
1999)).
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agency for final disposition, so such a certification process does not
assign all functions in a particular area to an outside entity. Moreover,
courts have held that agencies may subdelegate the definition of a
term in a federal regulation to a state agency as long as the state's
determinations are consistent with the statute. 228 The delegation here
involves state-law determinations rather than elements of federal law,
which should make it more likely that allocation to the state is
permissible.
If agency certification is nonetheless considered inappropriate
subdelegation, practical resolutions are available. Agencies can get
advice from any source, as long as the federal actor makes the final
decision. 229 The problem is that to avoid issuing advisory opinions, the
federal actor should treat state court opinions as binding; however, to
avoid inappropriate subdelegation, the federal actor should get the
last word. The pragmatic solution is that an opinion of a state court
answering a certified question is likely treated as binding whether it
is formally binding or not. This solution is the one reached in the case
of certification from federal courts. Whereas the Fifth Circuit
suggested early in the use of the certification mechanism that answers
are "merely advisory and entitled, like dicta, to be given persuasive
but not binding effect as a precedent,"2 30 courts have since abandoned
that notion. 231 One sees a similar accommodation regarding advisory
opinions. Advisory opinions, where permitted, are not formally
binding, but are "almost invariably accepted by those who requested
the opinion and are cited quite frequently in later cases both at home
and in other jurisdictions as authority." 232 Alternatively, a state might
have its judges opine in their individual capacity.

C. Mixed Federal-and State-Law Questions
A final obstacle to implementation is the concern that the
federal and state questions that arise in agency proceedings may be
228. Vierra v. Rubin, 915 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990).
229. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 359 F.3d at 565-66 ("[A] federal agency may turn to an
outside entity for advice and policy recommendations, provided the agency makes the final
decisions itself... . An agency may not, however, merely 'rubber-stamp' decisions made by others
under the guise of seeking their 'advice' . . . nor will vague or inadequate assertions of final
reviewing authority save an unlawful subdelegation.").
230. Sun Ins. Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1963).
231. See, e.g., Engel v. CBS, Inc., 182 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1999) (giving significant weight to
answers to certified questions). See generally WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & AMAR, supra note 14, §
4248 n.69 (discussing court decisions that treated certification decisions as binding).
232. Stevens, supra note 198, at 7.
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inextricable. Although this obstacle is surmountable, the concern
arises with particular force in the agency context because agencies
lack diversity jurisdiction and because Schor permits consideration of
state-law issues only when they are related to federal claims.
That said, the state-law and the federal-law questions before
an agency may be easily separable and identifiable. For example,
CFTC reparations proceedings may consider a state-law counterclaim
for a debt. 233 The counterclaim is integral to the federal scheme in that
the scheme includes a dispute resolution apparatus intended to
resolve all parts of the dispute in one agency-provided forum; 234
however, the state-law standard is not intertwined with federal
statutes or regulations. The CA, Inc., questions of law that the SEC
certified to the Delaware court were similarly separable: Was a
proposal mandating reimbursement of dissident shareholders' proxy
solicitation expenses a proper subject for action by shareholders under
Delaware law, and would its adoption cause the company to violate
Delaware law?2 3 5
Such easy separability will not always be the case. In the
immigration context, for instance, one ground for exclusion or
deportation for a criminal offense depends on a federal requirement of
"moral turpitude," which in turn depends on "whether the proscribed
act, as defined by the law of the State in which it was committed,
includes elements which necessarily demonstrate the baseness,
vileness and depravity of the perpetrator." 236
This problem is not unique to agency certification: discrete
state-law issues may arise in federal court in diversity actions or in
those based on supplemental jurisdiction. Nonetheless, determination
of state and federal law may sometimes be intertwined. 237 The solution
found in certification from federal courts or agencies lies both in the
standard-that
the
state-law
issue
be
"dispositive"
or
"determinative"-and in the voluntariness of certification. Both
suggest that certification will not or should not be invoked when the
state and federal questions are inseparable.
233. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 838 (1986); see also Pal v. Reifler Trading Corp., C.F.T.C.
No. 95-1151, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
27,237, 1998 WL 39420 (Feb. 2, 1998) (deciding
whether respondents were contractually entitled to attorneys fees and costs for their successful
reparations counterclaim to recover a debt).
234. 478 U.S. at 855-56.
235. SEC Certification of Questions of Law, supra note 67.
236. Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F. Supp. 433, 435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
237. Cf. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg, 545 U.S. 308, 312-14 (2005)
(basing federal question jurisdiction on a state-law quiet title claim in which the validity of the
title turned on whether the IRS gave proper notice under federal law).
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D. Proposed CertificationProcedure
This section details the proposed agency certification procedure
and examines how it would modify current practice. Existing
certification procedures are enabled through state legal rules defining
the jurisdiction of the highest state court. The source of these rules
may be the state constitution, jurisdictional statutes, court rules, case
law, or some combination of these. The proposed mechanism would
expand the permissible certifying entities to include federal agencies
by modifying these existing state frameworks. Such amendments by
states should be accompanied by rules at the federal level defining
which questions of state law can be certified and by whom.
To enable agency certification, a state should add "federal
agency" to the list of entities from which the highest state court may
accept certified questions. Although a necessary first step, such an
amendment generally would not be enough to permit certification of
questions that arise in a broad range of agency activity. States must
also decide whether to modify the requirement that the resolution of
the state-law question be "determinative" or "dispositive" of "pending
litigation"-requirements suggested by the Uniform Act and widely
adopted by states.
If these requirements are left in place, certification may be
limited to questions that arise in formal agency adjudication, or
informal action with aspects of litigation (e.g., opposing parties
involved in an adversarial proceeding). On the one hand, such an
amendment has the benefit of being a natural outgrowth of
certification from non-Article III courts and avoiding some of the
difficult concerns about advisory opinions. On the other hand, the
extent to which such an amendment would reach agency informal
action is unclear.
If a state wants its highest court to be able to decide state-law
questions that arise in a broader range of agency activities, it could
add a new provision. Using the Uniform Act formulation 238 as a
baseline and drawing on the flexible Delaware standard, the proposed
provision could add language like the following to the existing grant of
answering power:
The [Supreme Court] of this State may answer a question of law certified to it by a
federal agency if there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or

238. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 53 (1995) ('The
[Supreme Court] of this State may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the
United States . . . .").
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statute of this State and it appears to the [Supreme Court] of this State that there are
important and urgent reasons for an immediate determination of such questions by it.

Other than the above amendments, extending certification to
all federal agencies, as this Article proposes, could rely on existing
state-law certification standards to ensure that the types of questions
that are certified are consistent with the goals of federal-state
cooperation and each branch's institutional expertise. Questions of
state law could be certified when they are open questions; in other
words, when no controlling precedent exists in state law. 239 The issue
should be important to state policy or state legal schemes. Finally,
existing rules providing, for instance, that information developed at
the federal level be sent to the state court, that the certified question
be precisely defined, or that the two sides be given the opportunity to
be heard before the state court would apply to certification from
federal agencies, just as they apply to other forms of certification. 240
Furthermore, like judicial certification, the proposed
mechanism is voluntary on both sides. The state court may reject a
question certified to it, allowing the state court to evaluate whether
the question is sufficiently important to state policy or legal schemes
to be worth the devotion of judicial resources and time. 241 With some
limits discussed below, agency certification would also be voluntary for
the agency, allowing the agency to evaluate whether certification
would allow for timely resolution of the issue, whether a state-law
issue is sufficiently separable, and other considerations relevant to the
effective use of the mechanism.
Although this Article focuses primarily on whether states
should expand the jurisdiction of their highest courts to hear
questions from federal agencies, guidance is also needed for the
agencies that would have the power to certify questions. Because of
the variety of federal agencies, such guidance would likely take the
form of guidelines internal to each agency, designed with sensitivity to
the structure and purpose of the particular agency. Agencies should be
239. Id. § 3 (proposing a certification standard that requires that there be "no controlling
appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State").
240. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150(b) (requiring "a statement of the facts showing the nature of the
cause and the circumstances out of which the questions of law arise, and the questions of law to
be answered" as well as establishing a procedure for the federal record to be sent to the state
court).
241. Id. at cmt. (expanding the certifying entities to include any court of the United States
and reasoning that the discretion of the answering court mitigates any concern that this
expansion would overburden them: 'Ultimately, the receiving court retains the power to accept
or reject a certified question so that it can control its docket even though the number of courts
from whom it may receive a certified question has been expanded.").

232

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1:181

instructed as to which questions should be certified, the form in which
the question is posed, and which actor within the agency should
advance it.
The starting point for such agency guidance may be the present
system of judicial certification. 24 2 For instance, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has developed court rules that detail
when a question might be certified and mirror the requirements in
most answering state courts. The court may certify "an unsettled and
significant question of state law that will control the outcome of a case
pending before this Court." 24 3 Agencies might also include a standard
aimed at the importance of the state-law issue, just as judicially
created requirements do. These rules might also indicate which
officials may certify a question. Whereas it may be relatively
straightforward to designate the administrative law judge in the
adjudicative context, it may be more difficult, given the variety of
actors and forms, to identify the appropriate actor when a federal
agency undertakes informal action.
Finally, ex ante guidance for the agency is particularly
important because
the
agency
wears multiple hats-both
decisionmaker and party-in some formal and informal adjudications.
Whereas some agency adjudication is very much like judicial
adjudication, in that the agency provides a decisionmaker that
resolves disputes between two private parties engaged in adversarial
proceedings, 244 in other settings the agency may be an interested
"party." In the administrative law judge decisions of the NLRB or
SEC, the adjudication is trial-like in that it involves a dispute between
opposing parties and results in a reviewable record and decision, but it
differs from federal court in that the agency is both the adjudicator
242. The Delaware/SEC example does not provide a model. SEC staff has indicated that
"[w]e're very excited to have this tool [of certification to the Delaware court] at our disposal, and
look forward to using it further, as appropriate, in coming years." John W. White, Dir., Div. of
Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address at the American Bar Association, Section of
Business Law, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities: Corporation Finance in 2008-A
Year of Progress 32 (Aug. 11, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2008/
spch081108jww.htm. The SEC has not, however, indicated when and by whom the procedure is
appropriately invoked.
243. 2D CIR. R. § 0.27. Similarly, the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act proposes
that a state court have the power to certify if "pending litigation involves a question to be decided
under the law of the other jurisdiction," the answer "may be determinative of an issue in the
pending litigation," and when "an answer is not provided by a controlling appellate decision,
constitutional provision, or statute of the other jurisdiction." UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS
OF LAW ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 51 (1995).
244. Winship, supra note 90, at 138 (comparing the CFTC's provision of a decisionmaker to
agency's role as counsel in the context of investor compensation).
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and a party. When an agency determines eligibility for benefits, the
two interested parties are the agency and the person potentially
eligible for benefits. In such situations, the agency may have a vested
interest in the outcome that-in the absence of internal, ex ante
guidance-would influence which questions it chooses to certify.
Similarly, if certification were to be used in the context of decisions
about regulatory preemption, the agency may not be motivated to
certify any question, favoring preemption by its own rules or at least
agency determination of preemption. In those circumstances, the need
for internal or outside guidance 245 is even more pressing.
CONCLUSION

Certification from federal agencies to state courts operates
along two axes: federal-to-state and branch-to-branch. Although the
fact that the federal actor is an agency shapes some aspects of the
federal-state interaction, considerations of federalism and comity
generally underlie any certification between the federal and state
systems, whether from a court or an agency. Implementing such a
mechanism signals respect for state sovereignty, particularly when
questions affect policies or legal schemes important to the state. It
does so by providing additional opportunities to decide state law and
also preserving state control over certain primary conduct.
The fact that this mechanism is interbranch as well as
interjurisdictional intensifies the reasons and need for such a
procedure. Two characteristics of federal agencies make agency
certification
particularly
useful.
The
procedure
assigns
decisionmaking according to institutional expertise: it allocates
decisions between federal agencies, which are expert in the federal
regimes they administer (but not beyond) and state courts, which are
expert in their own states' laws. In this respect, agency certification is
more pressing than the well-established certification between courts.
For courts, the premise of diversity jurisdiction is that the federal
court has the capacity to act as an additional state court. In contrast,
federal agencies are neither expert outside of their specialized area,
nor are they generalists. Certification by federal agencies accordingly
enables sensible institutional allocation of open and important statelaw issues.

245. For example, guidance might consist of an executive order like the one ordering
agencies to include a statement on the preemptive effect in their regulations. See supra note 148
and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, federal agency certification addresses a problem
central to the activity of federal agencies: How do we subject informal
action to an appropriate level of review, one that neither hamstrings
the agency by preventing creative use of limited resources nor allows
the agency unfettered discretion? Interbranch certification constitutes
another way to provide guidance and legitimacy to agencies when they
act informally; it is also a safety valve where review of an important
state-law issue by a court is not otherwise practically or legally
available.
For all of these reasons, states should consider following and
expanding on Delaware's lead to institute federal agency certification,
a flexible mechanism with the potential to promote cooperative
interbranch federalism.

